Still the Century of Corporatism?
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The twentieth century will be the century of corporatism just as the nineteenth was the century of liberalism...
Mihai Manelescu

Until recently, Manelescu's confident prediction could easily be dismissed as yet another example of the ideological bias, wishful thinking and overinflated rhetoric of the thirties, an événementielle response to a peculiar environment and period. With the subsequent defeat of Fascism and National Socialism, the spectre of corporatism no longer seemed to haunt the European scene so fatalistically. For a while, the concept itself was virtually retired from the active lexicon of politics, although it was left on behavioral exhibit, so to speak, in such museums of atavistic political practice as Portugal and Spain.

Lately, however, the spectre is back amongst us — verbally at least — haunting the concerns of contemporary social scientists with increasing frequency and in multiple guises. Almost forty years to the day when Manelescu (1936:7) declared that "the ineluctable course of fate involves the transformation of all the social and political institutions of our times in a corporatist direction," perhaps we should again take his prediction seriously and inquire whether we might still be in the century of corporatism — but only just becoming aware of it.
The purposes of this essay are to explore various usages of the concept of corporatism, to suggest an operational definition of it as a distinctive, modern system of interest representation, to discuss the utility of distinguishing subtypes of corporatist development and practice and, finally, to set forth some general hypotheses “explaining” the probable context of its emergence and persistence.

I

The first step, I propose, is to rescue the concept of corporatism from various usages of it which have crept into the literature and which seem (to me) to do more to dissipate than to enhance its utility. On the one hand, it has become such a vaguely bounded phenomenon that, like clientelism, it can be found everywhere and, hence, is nowhere very distinctive; on the other hand, it has been so narrowly attached to a single political culture, regime-type or macrostructural configuration that it becomes, at best, uniquely descriptive rather than comparatively analytic.

Undoubtedly, the most difficult task is to strip the concept of its pejorative tone and implication. This is made all the more difficult by the fact that — unlike the thirties — there are very few regimes today who overtly and proudly advertise themselves as corporatist. It, therefore, becomes a tempting game to unveil and denounce as corporatist, practices which regimes are condoning or promoting under other labels, such as “participation,” “collaborative planning,” “mixed representation,” and “permanent consultation.” On the other hand, if corporatism is left to mean simply “interest-group behavior or systems I do not like” and/or used synonymously with such epithets as “fascist” and “repressive,” then it can become of little or no utility for purposes of systematic comparison. This is not to say that those who use the concept must somehow be enjoined from uttering evaluative statements or even from expressing strong normative reactions to its role or consequences. I have now studied several corporatist systems and come openly to quite firm personal judgments about each of them. But, I hope that those who disagree on its desirability can at least arrive at some common prior agreement as to the empirical referents which identify its basic structure and behavior. They then can dispute the costs and benefits and the intrinsic “goods” and “bads” it produces.

In my work I have found it useful to consider corporatism as a system of interest and/or attitude representation, a particular model or ideal–typical institutional arrangement for linking the associatively organized interests of civil society with the decisional structures of the state. As such it is one of several possible modern configurations of interest representation, of which pluralism is perhaps the best-known and most frequently acknowledged alternative — but more about that below.

Restricting the concept, so to speak, to refer only to a specific concrete set of institutional practices or structures involving the representation (or misrepresentation) of empirically observable group interests has a number of important implications. These sharply differentiate my preferred usage from those of several others who have recently employed the same conceptual label.

First, by defining corporatism in terms of its praxis, the concept is liberated from its employment in any particular ideology or system of ideas. While as will become manifest in later sections of this essay, I am quite interested in the arguments put forth by particular proponents of modern or neocorporatism, my reading of its use in the recent history of ideas suggests that an extraordinary variety of theorists, ideologues and activists have advocated it for widely divergent motives, interests and reasons.

These range from such romantic, organic theorists of the state as Friedrich Schlegel, Adam von Müller, G. W. Friedrich Hegel and Rudolf Kjellen; to the pre-Marxist, protosocialists Sismondi, Saint-Simon and Proudhon; to the Social Christian, ethically traditionalist thought of Wilhelm von Ketteler, Karl von Vogelsang, the Marquis de la Tour de Pin, Albert de Mun and, of course, Pope Leo XIII and Pius XI; to the fascist authoritarianism of Giuseppe Bottai, Guido Bortolotto, Giuseppe Papi and Francesco Vito; to the secular modernizing nationalism of a Mihail Manolescu; to the radical (in the French sense) bourgeois solidarism of Léon Duguit, Joseph-Paul Boncour, Georges Renard and Emile Durkheim; to the mystical universalism of an Ottmar Spann; to the internationalist functionalism of Giuseppe di Micheli and David Mitran; to the reactionary, pseudo-Catholic integralism of Charles Maurras, Oliveira Salazar, Marcello Caetano and Jean Bréhe de la Gressaye; to the technocratic, procapitalist reformism of Walter Rathenau, Lord Keynes and A. A. Berle, Jr.; to the anticapitalist syndicalism of Georges Sorel, Sergio Panunzio, Ugo Spirito, Edmondo Rossetti, Enrico Corradini and Gregor Strasser; to the guild socialism of G. D. H. Cole, the early
Harold Laski, S. G. Hobson and Ramiro de Maeztu; to the
communitarianism or bourgeois socialism of a François Perroux or an
Henri de Man — not to mention such contemporary advocates as
Bernard Crick, W. H. Ferry, Pierre Mendès-France and David
Apter.

All of these — and the list is by no means complete nor are the
above groupings by any means sharply distinctive — have conver-
ged upon the advocacy of an institutional relationship between
the systems of authoritative decision-making and interest represen-
tation which can be considered as generically corporatist by my prax-
iological definition (and frequently defined as such by the authors
themselves), although they conceived of this arrangement as involv-
ing radically different structures of power and influence, as
benefiting quite distinct social classes, and as promoting
diametrically opposite public policies.

A French student of corporatism described the situation quite
well when he said:

The army of corporatists is so disparate that one is led to think that the word
"corporation," itself is like a label placed on a whole batch of bottles which are
then distributed among diverse producers each of whom fills them with the drink
of his choice. The consumer has to look carefully [Baudin, 1942: 4-5]

The situation is even further confused by the fact that many con-
temporary theorists, ideologists and activists are peddling the same
drink under yet other labels.

Not only is corporatism defined as an ideology (or worse as a
Weltanschauung) difficult to pin down to a central set of values or
beliefs and even more difficult to associate with the aspirations or
interests of a specific social group, but virtually all detailed em-
pirical inquiries of corporatist praxis have shown its performance
and behavior to be at considerable variance — if not diametrically
opposed — to the beliefs manifestly advanced by its verbal
defenders. As another French scholar of the Forties (himself an ad-
vocate of corporatism à sa manière) observed, "The reality of ex-
isting corporatism is, without a doubt, infinitely less seductive
than the doctrine." [Murat, 1944:206] Contemporary concep-
tualizations of corporatism based exclusively on the stated motives
and goals of actors or their apologists tend only to obfuscate this
"less than seductive" reality in praxis.

In short, I find there is simply too much normative variety and
behavioral hypocrisy in the use of the corporatist ideological label
to make it a useful operational instrument for comparative
analysis.

Nor do I find it very productive to consider corporatism to be an
exclusive part or a distinctive product of a particular political
culture, especially one linked to some geographically circumscribed
area such as the Iberian Peninsula or the Mediterranean. This
approach to corporatism not only runs up against the usual (and in
my view, well-founded) criticisms raised against most, if not all,
political-cultural "explanations" — especially against those based
on impressionistic evidence and circular reasoning — but also fails
completely to explain why similar configurations and behavior in
interest politics have emerged and persisted in a great variety of
cultural settings, stretching from Northern Europe, across the
Mediterranean to such exotic places as Turkey, Iran, Thailand, In-
donesia and Tawian, to name but a few. This form of pseu-
dod-explanation also cannot contribute much to answering the question of
why, even within the presumed homeland of such an ethos, that is,
the Iberian Peninsula and its "fragments," corporatism has waxed
and waned during different periods. Are we to believe that political culture is a sort of "spigot variable" which gets turned
on every once in a while to produce a different system of func-
tional representation? Also we might ask, why do societies sup-
pposedly sharing the same general ethos exhibit such wide diversity
in interest-group values, practices and consequences? By all em-
pirically available standards, Spain is more Catholic than Portugal,
Colombia more so than Brazil, yet in each case it is the latter which
has by far the more corporatist system. At best, then, culturalist
arguments must be heavily supplemented to account for such em-
barassing deviations in outcome.

Finally, since those who have advanced such an explanation also
tend to place a great deal of emphasis on ideology (occasionally
even accepting word for fact), we might wonder why the major
ideologues of corporatism have not come from this part of the
world. A quick glance at the admittedly incomplete bibliography
attached to this essay will show that the intellectual origins of cor-
poratism are predominately German, Belgian, French and Austrian
and, secondarily and belatedly, English, Italian and Romanian.
Those who advocated corporatism in the Iberian and Latin
American areas unabashedly and unashamedly imported their ideas
from abroad. Modern, nonmedieval, corporatism was diffused to
the Iberian-Mediterranean area, not created within it.\textsuperscript{4}

Another tendency which has cropped up in recent discussions of corporatism is to define or, better, submerge it into some wider political configuration such as "the organic state" or "the authoritarian regime."\textsuperscript{26} The "organic state" concept runs up against many of the criticisms of definitional vagueness, lack of potential empirical specificity and circularity of argument leveled above at the political cultural approach. More importantly, it fails to take into account the historical fact that many "organically conceived" states were not composed of corporatist subunits, but built upon a great variety of "organs" ranging from the 	extit{curies} and 	extit{phratries} of Fustel de Coulanges’s ancient city,\textsuperscript{11} to the "metallic" orders of moral excellence in Plato’s ideal polity,\textsuperscript{22} to the three to five estate systems of various ancients régimes,\textsuperscript{13} to the phalanges of Fourier,\textsuperscript{14} to the 	extit{régions} of Robert LaFon,\textsuperscript{15} even to the autonomous, plural communities of Percival and Paul Goodman or Gar Alperovitz.\textsuperscript{19} If one accepts that a special characteristic of modern corporatism (this in both ideology and practice) concerns the role of functional interest associations, then it is but one of many possible structural units, for example, familial, territorial-communitarian, moral, religious, "productionist," etc., which may go into the establishment of an "organic state." Emphasizing that macrocharacteristic does little to specify concrete relations of authority, influence and representation, except to differentiate them from equally vague notions of the "mechanical state."

The relation of corporatism in interest politics to a specific global type of political regime is a much more complicated (and, in my view, interesting) issue. For reasons which will, I hope, become apparent in the course of this essay I have found it more useful to define it as a concrete, observable general system of interest representation which is "compatible" with several different regime-types, i.e., with different party systems, varieties of ruling ideology, levels of political mobilization, varying scopes of public policy, etc. Then I will endeavor to specify distinct subtypes of corporatist representation which seem to have at least an elective affinity for, if not to be essential defining elements of, specific regime-types during specific periods of their development.\textsuperscript{17}

Yet another tendency in the revived discussion of corporatism which differs from that proposed here is that which submerges the concept, not in some wider concept of regional political culture, state form or regime-type, but in some macrosocietal characteristic such as the presence of visual stigmata,\textsuperscript{18} or the existence of religiously, ideologically or linguistically determined 	extit{zuilen, lager}, or 	extit{familien spirituelles}.\textsuperscript{19} Here the problem is simply that stigmatized or pillarized societies exhibit quite different degrees of corporatism in the sense used herein and that, vice versa, many heavily corporatized systems of interest representation exist in societies which have no marked visual stigmatization or pillarized social and cultural structures. Sweden is no less corporatized because it lacks both dimensions;\textsuperscript{20} Belgium no more so because it suffers from both.\textsuperscript{21} These are interesting and salient dimensions of societies, in and by themselves, but they do not seem to bear any close association with the phenomenon upon which I recommend we focus our attention with the concept of corporatism.

In the present state of nominalistic anarchy prevailing in the discipline, it is absurd to pretend that scholars will somehow "rally" to a particular conceptualization, spurn alternative uses of the term, and, henceforth, agree to disagree on the basis of a common lexical definition. About all one can expect from an introductory discussion such as this may be to gain a few recruits for a more specific and bounded use of the concept of corporatism, and to warn the reader that a great deal of what has recently been written about corporatism and of what will subsequently be discussed in this essay may be of no mutual relevance at all.

II

Having rejected a series of alternative usages of the concept of corporatism and expressed a preference for a more empirically bounded specification which focuses on a set of relatively directly observable, institutionally distinctive traits involving the actual practice of interest representation, it is now incumbent upon me to produce such a conceptual specification:

Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.\textsuperscript{22}
Obviously, such an elaborate definition is an ideal-type description, a heuristic and logicoanalytical construct composed of a considerable variety of theoretically or hypothetically interrelated components. No empirically extant system of interest representation may perfectly reproduce all these dimensions, although two of which I have studied in some detail (Brazil and Portugal) come rather close. While the whole gestalt or syndrome is not directly accessible to measurement, its postulated components can be easily assessed, if not immediately quantified. Such detailed inquiry into the extent to which a given system of representation is limited in number of component units, compulsory in membership, non-competitive between compartmentalized sectors, hierarchically ordered in internal structure, recognized or certified in some de jure or de facto way by the state, successful in exercising a representative monopoly within functionally determined categories and subject to formal or informal controls on leadership selection and interest articulation will not only enable us to distinguish what type of interest system it belongs to, but may help us gauge the extent to which these multiple dimensions are empirically as well as logically interrelated. It is, of course, quite conceivable at this early stage in research into these matters that what I have found to be a set of interrelated institutional practices coexisting into a distinctive, highly covariant and resistant modern system of interest representation may be quite limited in its scope of applicability, for example, only to Iberian authoritarian regimes, or restricted to only subtype of corporatism, such as one “artificially” established from above by the state.

One purpose in developing this elaborate general model, beyond that of describing the behavior of a certain number of political systems which have interested me, is to offer to the political analyst an explicit alternative to the paradigm of interest politics which has hitherto completely dominated the discipline of the North American political science: pluralism. While a considerable number of scholars have discovered that pluralism (and with it, the closely associated liberal democratic regime-type) may be of little utility in describing the likely structure and behavior of interest-group systems in contemporary developing politics, and while some have even gone so far as to suggest that it may no longer be of much utility when applied to the practices of advanced industrial politics, few if any of these scholars have proposed an alternative or contrasting model of modern representative association-state relations. Most of them merely mourn the passing or degeneration of pluralism and either advocate its return, its replacement with some more formalistic, authoritative (if not authoritarian) “juridical democracy,” or its periodic bouleventr by spontaneous social movements.

Pluralism and corporatism share a number of basic assumptions, as would almost any realistic model of modern interest politics: (1) the growing importance of formal associational units of representation; (2) the persistence and expansion of functionally differentiated and potentially conflicting interests; (3) the burgeoning role of permanent administrative staffs, of specialized information, of technical expertise and, consequently, of entrenched oligarchy; (4) the decline in the importance of territorial and partisan representation; and (5) the secular trend toward expansion in the scope of public policy and (6) interpenetration of private and public decision arenas. Nevertheless, despite this wide area of mutual agreement, pluralism differs markedly from corporatism as an ideal-typical response to these facts of modern political life.

Pluralism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically and self-determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories which are not specially licensed, recognized, subsidized, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activities within their respective categories.

Practitioners of corporatism and of pluralism would heartily agree with James Madison that “among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control (my emphasis) the violence of faction.” They would also agree that “giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions and the same interests... is as impracticable as [suppressing them altogether — PCS] would be unwise.” Where the two practitioners would begin to diverge is with Madison’s further assertion that “it is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests and render them all subservient to the public good.” Corporatists, basing their faith either on the superior wisdom of an authoritarian leader or the enlightened foresight of technocratic planners, believe that such a public unity can be found and kept. Their “scheme of representation,” to use Madison’s
felicitous phrase, instead of extending the "number of citizens" and the "sphere of interests" would compress them into a fixed set of verticalized categories each representing the interdependent functions of an organic whole. Madison's metaphor was more mechanistic, and more dynamic. Hence, he was less sanguine about limiting and ordering the sources of faction — whether from above by imposition or from below by elimination. Corporatists of whatever stripe express confidence that an "enlightened statesman" (or an "enlightened state") can co-opt, control, or coordinate not only those "most frivolous and fanciful distinctions [which] have been sufficient to kindle unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts," but also that "most common and durable source of faction...the various and unequal distribution of property."

In short, both pluralists and corporatists recognize, accept and attempt to cope with the growing structural differentiation and interest diversity of the modern polity, but they offer opposing political remedies and divergent images of the institutional form that such a modern system of interest representation will take. The former suggest spontaneous formation, numerical proliferation, horizontal extension and competitive interaction; the latter advocate controlled emergence, quantitative limitation, vertical stratification and complementary interdependence. Pluralists place their faith in the shifting balance of mechanically intersecting forces; corporatists appeal to the functional adjustment of an organically interdependent whole.

While time and space limitations prevent me from developing the ideas further, I suspect that these two contrasting but not diametrically opposed syndromes do not by any means exhaust the possible alternative system-types of modern interest representation.

For example, the Soviet experience suggests the existence of a "monist" model which could be defined as

a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a fixed number of singular, ideologically selective, noncompetitive, functionally differentiated and hierarchically ordered categories, created, subsidized and licensed by a single party and granted a representational role within that party and vis-a-vis the state in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders, formulation of demands and mobilization of support.

Much more difficult to specify in terms of the component dimen-

sions we have been using for the other three because of its radical and utopian nature is the syndicalist alternative. Barely sketched in by a number of theorists (several of whom subsequently became corporatists), this projected model seems to reject or to seek to transform substantially many of the given characteristics of the modern political process — more or less accepted or even encouraged by the other three syndromes. Nevertheless, a brief description of its characteristics will be offered below, partly because it has emerged with increasing frequency (if not specificity) in recent discussions of participation and representation, and partly because it seems to round out in logical terms the combinatorial possibilities of the variables used to define the other three types.

Syndicalism could be defined as a system of interest aggregation (more than representation) in which the constituent units are an unlimited number of singular, voluntary, noncompetitive (or better mixed-off) categories, not hierarchically ordered or functionally specialized, neither recognized, created nor licensed by state or party, not controlled in their leadership selection or interest articulation by state or party, not exercising a representational monopoly but resolving their conflicts and "authoritatively allocating their values" autonomously without the interference of the state.

With this last definition-model we have moved some distance from our stated limited concern with specifying the characteristics of corporatism as a distinctive and self-sustaining system of interest representation, and not confusing it with a whole system of political domination. Nevertheless, this excursion has served to remind us that the process of capturing organizing and articulating the demands of civil society as well as those of receiving, interpreting and even applying the "imperative coordinations" of the state is only part of the political process, and hence only intelligible in purpose and consequence when considered in relation to other political subsystems and whole regime configurations. This wider set of concerns, ironically, leads us to a consideration of possible subtypes of corporatism.

III

To illustrate that the skeletal connotation of corporatism offered above accurately describes the system of interest representation of a large number of countries, including many whose global political
systems differ markedly, would not be difficult — even at the existing lamentable state of our empirical knowledge. Hence, it has been argued and rather convincingly shown that Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Greece, Mexico, and Yugoslavia have, by and large, singular, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered, sectorally compartmentalized, interest associations exercising representational monopsony and accepting (de jure or de facto) governmental imposed or negotiated limitations on the type of leaders they elect and on the scope and intensity of demands they routinely make upon the state. As a result, such associations have attained "a quasi-legal status and a prescriptive right to speak for their segments of the population. They influence the process of government directly, bypassing the [parliament]. They are agents of authority. They deputize for the state in whole sectors of public life, and they have duties delegated to them that properly belong to the civil service." [Huntford, 1972:86] The summary above applies specifically to Sweden, but it is broadly descriptive of the countries cited above — and undoubtedly of many others yet to be investigated.

Such a demonstration of broad structural identity does have the virtue of debunking, if not divesting, some of these policies of the pluralist labels they have acquired — a prestigious title usually bestowed upon them for no better reason than the mere existence of a multitude of organized interests. It may also serve to call into question the relevance of many supposed properties associated with pluralism and assumed, therefore, to apply to these policies: competitiveness within sectors and, hence, accountability to members; cross-pressures and overlap and, hence, vacillation and moderation in demands; open competitiveness between interest sectors and, hence, incremental, split-the-difference solutions; penetration and subordination of political parties and, hence, broad aggregative party goals, low party discipline and absence of strong partisan ideologies; absence of stable hierarchies of organizational influence and, hence, irrelevance of class or ruling elite as political categories; low barriers of entry into the policy process and, hence, key roles assigned to "potential groups" and absence of systematic bias or exclusion; major importance attached to lobbying and, hence, concentration of attention upon parliament; assumption that policy initiatives are produced by group activity "from below" and, hence, passive roles assumed on the part of state executive and administrative bureaucracies: wide dispersion of political resources and, hence, neither omnipotent veto groups nor powerless marginal elements; and, finally, sheer multiplicity of interests and free associability ensuring spontaneous emergence of countervailing forces and, hence, a general tendency toward homeostasis or shifting equilibria. Corporatist systems may manage to acquire and sustain similar outcomes of demand moderation, negotiated solutions, leader accountability, "deideologization," inclusive participation, countervailence of power and homeostatic balance, but they do not do so through the process which theorists and analysts of pluralism have emphasized. For example, in the studies I have conducted of one type of corporatism, I have found that such process features as preemption of issues; co-optation of leaders; vertical or sectoral policy compartmentalization; permanent institutionalization of access; "juridization" or legalization of group conflicts through labor and administrative courts; state technocratic planning and resource allocation; extensive development of functionally specialized, parastate agencies; political culture stressing formalism, consensus and continuous bargaining; symbiotic relation with clientelist and patronialist practices in certain issue areas and regime levels; deliberate narrowing and encapsulation of "relevant publics"; periodic but systematic use of physical repression and anticipatory intimidation and, finally, the establishment of what Dahrendorf called a "cartel of anxiety" among restricted elites representing the apexes of the differentiated hierarchic "orders" or "corporations" contributed to the persistence and viability of those systems — even over protracted periods of economic and social change and when faced with acute, externally induced political crises. While comparisons of institutional longevity are difficult to make, there is no evidence I can see that corporatist systems of whatever type are less stable or shorter lived than pluralist ones. There is, however, very strong evidence that they function quite differently — if often to produce generally similar outcomes.

This delineation of an equally elaborate, alternative model to pluralism may seem to some to be in and by itself sufficient justification for this exercise, but most readers must be feeling some vague sense of incompleteness if not of acute discomfort. After all, Sweden is not Portugal and Switzerland is not Greece; and yet, there they are — ignominiously grouped together under the same rubric.
The reason for this latent (or in some cases already manifest) sense of dissatisfaction lies, no doubt, in the stretch of the conceptual distinction I have made between corporatism and pluralism. While this may be an indispensable preliminary step in classifying interest systems, especially given the ubiquity and prestige of the pluralist label, it is still one which, to use Sartor's expression, "does not travel well," or better, "travels too far too easily." If our research objective is not to make universalizing suprahistorical comparisons, but to explore middle-range hypotheses which are explicitly qualified as to cultural, historical and even geographical space, then we must proceed further, per genus et differentiam, in our taxonomic trip. We must, in short, develop the notion of possible subtypes of corporatist interest politics (just as, of course, we should with pluralist ones, although that will not be attempted here).46

That most original and stimulating of corporatist theorists, Mihail Manolesco, provided the key distinction between two different subtypes. The one he called corporatisme pur, in which the legitimacy and functioning of the state were primarily or exclusively dependent on the activity of singular, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered representative "corporations." The second in contrast he called corporatisme subordonné, in which similarly structured "corporations" were created by and kept as auxiliary and dependent organs of the state which founded its legitimacy and effective functioning on other bases. [1936:92] This radical distinction is one which, as we shall see, involves not only the nature of power and influence relations but also the developmental pattern by which corporatism emerges, has been reiterated, expanded upon and discussed at great length by Portuguese corporatist theorists where the two subtypes were labelled corporativismo de associacao and corporativismo de Estado.48 For our purposes we could label the former, autonomous and penetrative, as societal corporatism; and the second, dependent and penetrated, as state corporatism.

Some clues to the structural and behavioral elements which differentiate these two subtypes of corporatism can be found in our initial global connotation, or more specifically in what was deliberately not included in that definition.

(1) Limited number: does not indicate whether established by processes of interassociational arrangement, by "political cartels" designed by existing participants to exclude newcomers, or by deliberate government restriction.

(2) Singular: does not indicate whether the outcome of spontaneous co-optation or competitive elimination by surviving associations, or by state-imposed eradication of multiple or parallel associations.

(3) Compulsory: does not specify whether de facto through social pressure, contractual dues checkoff, provision of essential services and/or acquisition of private licensing capacity, or de jure through labor code or other officially decreed, exclusively conceded authority.

(4) Noncompetitive: does not state whether the product of internal oligarchic tendencies or external, treaty-like, voluntary agreements among associations, or of the continuous interposition of state mediation, arbitration and repression.

(5) Hierarchically ordered: does not indicate whether the outcome of intrinsic processes of bureaucratic extension and/or consolidation, or of state-decreed centralization and administrative dependence.

(6) Functionally differentiated: does not specify whether arrived at through voluntaristic agreements on respective "turf" and nonraiding provisions, or by state-established enquadramento (framing) of occupational-vocational categories.

(7) Recognition by state: does not differentiate between recognition granted as a matter of political necessity imposed from below upon public officials and that granted from above by the state as a condition for association formation and continuous operation.

(8) Representational monopoly: similar to above, does not distinguish between that which is independently conquered and that which is dependently conceded.

(9) Controls on leadership selection and interest articulation: does not suggest whether this is the product of a reciprocal consensus on procedure and/or goals, or of an asymmetric imposition by the "organized monopolists of legitimate violence."

Through this exercise in intention — the further elaboration of properties which combine to form a global concept — we have constructed two quite distinctive subtypes. The first, involving all or most of the initial elements in the either/or dichotomies made above, corresponds ideally to what we have called societal corporatism. Empirically, it is best exemplified by the cases of Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark, as well as by emergent properties which have been observed by scholars in such other, supposedly pluralist, systems as Great Bri-
tain, Western Germany, France, Canada, and the United States. The second type, described by the latter elements in each either/or distinction, coalesces into a subtype we have labelled state corporatist and this conforms historically to the cases of Portugal, Spain, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Mexico, and Greece—as well of course to the defunct experiences of Fascist Italy, Peinist France, National Socialist Germany and Austria under Dollfuss.

When viewed statically, descriptively, institutionally, these two subtypes exhibit a basic structural similarity, one which sets them apart from pluralist, monist or syndicalist systems of interest representation. When viewed in motion, however, they are revealed as the products of very different political, social and economic processes, as the vehicles for very different power and influence relations, and as the purveyors of very different policy consequences. Societal corporatism is found imbedded in political systems with relatively autonomous, multilayered territorial units; open, competitive electoral processes and party systems; ideologically varied, coalitionally based executive authorities—even with highly “layered” or “pillared” political subcultures. State corporatism tends to be associated with political systems in which territorial subunits are tightly subordinated to central bureaucratic power; elections are nonexistent or plebiscitary; party systems are dominated or monopolized by a weak single party; executive authorities are ideologically exclusive and more narrowly recruited and are such that political subcultures based on class, ethnicity, language, or regionalism are repressed. Societal corporatism appears to be the concomitant, if not ineluctable, component of the postliberal, advanced capitalist, organized democratic welfare state; state corporatism seems to be a defining element of, if not structural necessity for, the antidemocratic, delayed capitalist, authoritarian, neomercantilist state.

IV

Corporatism appears under two very different guises: the revolutionary and the evolutionary. It is either the product of a “new order” (following from a fundamental overthrow of the political and economic institutions of a given country and created by force or special “collective spirit”; or the outcome of a natural evolution in economic and social ideas and events. In the latter case, corporatism then emerges as an aspect of a certain idea-force progressing along with the amplification and specification of the process of associational development.

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generating what one calls today in several democratic countries, “the corporative mystique.” [Mathers, 1946: 13-14].

The Swiss author of these lines, himself rather caught up in “the corporative mystique” which swept his country in the 1930’s, illustrates not only that theorists who contemplated the matter comparatively were well aware of the distinction between the two subtypes we have defined above, but were also quite conscious of the need for two essentially separate theories for explaining the emergence of modern corporatism. One of these would be more likely to emphasize long-term trends and slow, incremental change, cultural and institutional continuity, gradual intellectual awareness and passive political acceptance; the other more likely would be forged out of immediate conjuncture and impending collapse, strong leadership and repressive action, architeconic vision and inflated rhetoric. In a nutshell, the origins of societal corporatism lie in the slow, almost imperceptible decay of advanced pluralism; the origins of state corporatism lie in the rapid, highly visible demise of nascent pluralism.

The task of constructing this set of dual theories is enormous given the apparently bewildering variety of contexts in which one type or the other of corporatism has emerged, and the frustrating absence of empirical studies on the historical dynamics of whatever type of interest group system. Complicating the task even further is the natural tendency to confuse this problem with the more general and clearly interrelated one of the causes of the erosion/collapse of liberal democracy and the advent/consolidation of authoritarian rule. Even if we focus specifically and exclusively on those factors which hypothetically affect changes in the system of interest representation, we must admit from the start that the best we can do is to identify some probabilistically necessary but clearly insufficient conditions. We can only try post factum to strip historical cases of their idiosyncrasies of personality and culture, of their accidents of good and bad fortune, of their immediate but superficial catalysts and precipitants in order to reveal the underlying elements of structural conduciveess which led (and may lead in the future) to such similar and yet different outcomes as societal and state corporatism. I hardly need to emphasize the preliminary and speculative nature of the following dual theories.

Nor should I have to stress that they may not contribute much to explaining specific occurrences or nonoccurrences. For example,
why did the halting and tentative experiments in state corporatism by Sidónio Pais in Portugal (1917-18), Primo de Rivera in Spain (1923-30), Pangalos in Greece (1925) and José Uriburu in Argentina (1930-31) all fail to take hold when, ten to twelve years later, corporatism flourished in each case? Why did Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland and the Netherlands adopt internal "social peace" treaties between peak associations of employers and workers in the 1930s and then move rapidly and incrementally toward generalized societal corporatism in the 1940's and 1950's, while other countries such as Finland, Norway and Belgium moved more hesitantly and fitfully, and still others such as France, Great Britain, Ireland and the United States have proven consistently more resistant to the blandishments of corporatism? I doubt whether the following speculations can answer such specific questions very satisfactorily.

Whatever reservations one may have about the degree of determination exercised by the structure and mode of production upon such political variables as individual attitudes, voting choice, party systems and ideological doctrines, inquiry into the origins of corporatism of either type leads one very quickly to the constraints, opportunities and contradictions placed upon political actors by the operation of the economic system. More specifically for the cases which have interested me, it leads to a consideration of the basic institutions of capitalism and the class structure of property and power engendered by it. Perhaps it is the directness of the linkage between the system of interest representation and these institutions of concentration of production and inequality of distribution, but the resultant situation is particularly "naked." As a macrohypothesis, I suggest that corporatization of interest representation is related to certain basic imperatives or needs of capitalism to reproduce the conditions for its existence and continually to accumulate further resources. Differences in the specific nature of these imperatives or needs at different stages in the institutional development and international context of capitalism, especially as they affect the pattern of conflicting class interests, account for the difference in origins between the societal and state forms of corporatism.

Summarizing, again in a nutshell, the decay of pluralism and its gradual displacement by societal corporatism can be traced primarily to the imperative necessity for a stable, bourgeoisie-dominant regime, due to processes of concentration of ownership, competition between national economies, expansion of the role of public policy and rationalization of decision-making within the state to associate or incorporate subordinate classes and status groups more closely within the political process.

As for the abrupt demise of incipient pluralism and its dramatic and forceful replacement by state corporatism, this seems closely associated with the necessity to enforce "social peace," not by exempting and incorporating, but by suppressing and excluding the autonomous articulation of subordinate class demands in a situation where the bourgeoisie is too weak, internally divided, externally dependent and/or short of resources to respond effectively and legitimately to these demands within the framework of the liberal democratic state.

Of course, to these general elements, one must add several other "overdeterminative" factors which combine with the former, making corporatism an increasingly likely outcome: (1) secular trends toward bureaucratization and oligarchy within interest associations; (2) prior rates of political mobilization and participation; (3) diffusion of foreign ideologies and institutional practices; (4) impact of international war and/or depression. Nevertheless, the core of my speculation about structural conduciveness rests on the problems generated by delayed, dependent capitalist development and nonhegemonic class relations in the case of state corporatism, and advanced, monoply or concentrated capitalist development and collaborative class relations in the case of societal corporatism.

Turning to an explication of the advanced capitalism-societal corporatism relation, I shall be brief, partly because of my lesser familiarity with this side, partly because there exists a series of evocatively presented and excellently documented studies of the subject.

The first major theorist to perceive certain emergent imperatives of capitalism and to link them explicitly with corporatism was John Maynard (Lord) Keynes. In a startling essay published in 1926 entitled "The End of Laissez-Faire," Keynes first debunks the orthodox claims of liberalism:

It is not true that individuals possess a prescriptive "natural liberty" in their economic activities. There is no "compact" conferring perpetual rights on those who have or those who acquire. The world is not so governed from above that private and social interest always coincide. It is not a correct deduction from the Principles of Economics that enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest. Nor is it true that self-interest is enlightened; more often in
Given these negative results and sous-entendu a growing awareness of them among wider and wider publics exercising the liberal voluntaristic rights accorded them by the open franchise and free associability, the agenda and nonagenda (as Keynes called it) of the state must be modified. Or, as he put it more bluntly in another essay, "In the future, the Government will have to take on many duties which it has avoided in the past." [1952:331] The objective of this imperative policy expansion is to exercise "directive intelligence through some appropriate organ of action over the many intricacies of private business, yet...leave private initiative and enterprise unhindered." More specifically, he noted the need for (1) "deliberate control of the currency and of credit by a central institution," (2) "dissemination on a great scale of data relating to the business situations," (3) "coordinated act(s) of intelligent judgment...as to the scale on which it is desirable that the community as a whole should save the scale on which these savings should go abroad...and whether the present organization of the investment market distributes savings along the most rationally productive channels," and, finally, (4) "a considered national policy about what size of population...is most expedient." [1952:317-9] For 1926, that was a prescient statement about the future role of the state in capitalist societies — even down to the itemized content and sequential ordering of the new policy agenda.

Despite the unorthodoxy of these suggestions for "improvements in the technique of modern capitalism," Keynes wisely observed that "there is nothing in them which is seriously incompatible with what seems to me to be the essential characteristic of capitalism, namely the dependence upon an intense appeal to the money-making and money-loving instincts of individuals as the main motive force of the economic machine." [1952:319] The reason for his confidence in their compatibility stems from the political instrumentality he advocated to bring about this policy revolution, namely, societal corporatism.

I believe that in many cases the ideal size for the unit of control and organization lies somewhere between the individual and the modern state. I suggest, therefore, that progress lies in the growth and recognition of semi-autonomous bodies within the state — bodies whose criterion of action within their own field is solely...
ficial recognition of bona fide *interlocuteurs*, to devolved responsibilities for such public tasks as unemployment or accident insurance, to permanent membership in specialized advisory councils, to positions of control in joint public-private corporations, to informal, quasi-cabinet status, and finally to direct participation in authoritative decision-making through national economic and social councils. The sequence by which societal corporatism has crept into the polity probably varies considerably case by case, but to the extent that the Dutch pattern is representative, it shows a peculiar circular trend. There it began with local and sectoral level, jointly managed social insurance schemes (1913); then moved to abortive attempts at establishing Conciliation Boards (1919, 1923); to sectoral consultative bodies (1933); to public extensions of cartel decisions (1935) and labor-management agreements (1937), obligatorily covering nonmembers and nonparticipants; to sectoral licensing boards on investment (1938); to the reestablishment of a nationally coordinated wage determination board (1945); to indicative national planning (1945); then back to the establishment of specialized Product and Industrial Boards, along with an overall coordinating agency, the Social and Economic Council (1950); then down to the establishment of consultative councils in each individual enterprise (1950) and, finally, to the creation of a national level, joint co-ordination council for social insurance (1959) - right back where they started in 1913. The resultant pattern evolved pragmatically and unevenly, not by the unfolding of some concerted, grand corporatist design. It moved up and down from enterprise to local to national level; *back and forth* from a concern with specific goods and services (insurance, health, apprenticeship), to specialized vertical production areas (metallurgy, electronics, chemicals, retail commerce) and to broad horizontal sectors (industry, commerce, agriculture); and *sideways* from one issue area to another (wages, prices, investment, indicative planning). While the Netherlands' osmotic adaptation may be unique in many respects, I suspect that a sequential plotting of measures of creeping corporatism in other advanced capitalist societies would not be very different.

Thanks to the effort of Andrew Shonfield, it hardly seems necessary to pursue these speculations much further. In his magisterial, *Modern Capitalism*, he has demonstrated in great detail how, in order to correct inherent defects linked to processes of internal concentration and external competition, the modern
the Western world — showing its full powers to provide the great gifts of economic growth, full employment, and social welfare" — Shonfield searches for the causes of this abortive attempt to encourage corporatist forms of policy-making during the early New Deal (1933-35). He finds them in the internally competitive, overlapping jurisdictions of the federal and state bureaucracies, the preferred leadership style of Roosevelt ("his penchant for the role of bargainer-in-chief, his evident delight in the exercise of a kind of administrative athleticism"), in the active, intrusive role of Congress in the administrative process, the juridical and legalistic imprint imposed on the American state by the special role which lawyers have played within it, and in the absence of a more professionalized, self-confident elite of civil servants. [1965:298-329] While Shonfield does carry his analysis into the mid-1960's, it is too bad that it stops before Lyndon Johnson and even more rapidly, Richard Nixon, managed to transform this "arm's-length relationship with private enterprise" (as Shonfield described it) into something more closely resembling the sort of "active huddle" which the NRA corporatists had advocated in the early thirties.11

Modern Capitalism provides us with a veritable gold mine of interesting general hypotheses concerning the emergence of societal corporatism and specific, if somewhat ad hoc, subhypotheses explaining its differential role in contemporary Western politics and its emergent relations with other policy-mechanisms of advanced capitalist management. From my admittedly less knowledgeable vantage point, I would tend to emphasize a longer period of historical regress, for example, to include planning, rationing, mobilization and reconstruction measures taken during and following World War I and their impact upon subsequent "public policy paradigms." Add to these a more explicit discussion of certain political variables, such as degree of prior class consciousness and intensity of class antagonism, extent of prior party-interest association interpenetration (lager-type structures), ideological diffusion and international climate, plus prior rates of political mobilization and participation. Nevertheless, in our understanding of societal corporatism we are off to an impressive, if still speculative, start.

We are not so fortunately endowed at either the theoretically-deductive or the empirico-inductive level with respect to state corporatism. Of course, one reason is that there exists no companion volume to Modern Capitalism entitled Dependent or Derived Capitalism — not yet. But this lack of detailed comparative case studies or even good single country monographs is only part of the difficulty.

Theorists-apologists for state corporatism are usually not very helpful. This, not so much because they tended to be less perceptive and personally objective than, say, Lord Keynes, but because they were caught in a built-in contradiction between their subjective speculative task and the objective political function they were indirectly called upon to perform.

So, for example, there is scarcely a single state-corporatist theorist who does not proclaim his opposition to statism, his commitment to decisional decentralization and his desire for eventual associational autonomy. Nevertheless, our theorist is aware that given the fragmented, ideologically charged and class-divided nature of the political system he is operating within singular, non-conflictive, hierarchically ordered and functionally compartmentalized associations are not likely to be spontaneously forthcoming. He therefore advocates the temporary use of state authority to establish these compulsory structures — and to remove voluntaristic, competing ones — all, of course, in the name of national and/or public interest. Other than some vaguely specified reference to the eventual emergence of a "corporatist consciousness" (his equivalent to the New Soviet Man), our theorist conveniently forgets to specify the political mechanism by which the state's authoritarian presence can be made to "fade out," leaving those imagined self-governing agents of decentralized decision-making behind. Perhaps the most obvious case of this praxiologiacal hypocrisy has been Portugal, if only because Oliveira Salazar so repeatedly and (apparently) sincerely expressed his fervent opposition to statism or even to any form of governmental economic intervention, while presiding over the creation of one of the most overbureaucratized, minutely regulated, centralized state apparatuses ever observed.

If such theorists can hardly be trusted with regard to the state, then neither can one expect them to be entirely candid about corporatism's relation to capitalism and specific class interests. One of their favorite themes — admittedly one which is today somewhat less loudly proclaimed — is that corporatism from above constitutes some sort of tertium genus between and distinct from either capitalism or socialism-communism. Hence, while they are often capable of decrying, in lurid and quite convincing terms, the inequitable and rachitic performance of existing capitalist institu-
tions (and of conjuring up terrible visions of life under godless socialism), they are obviously not very concerned with revealing how the forceful implantation of corporatism acts as an instrument for rescuing and consolidating capitalism rather than replacing it. Given the unanimous emphasis they place on functional interdependence and group harmony, we should hardly expect them to delve too deeply into the elements of class conflict, status antagonism and center-periphery tension that such an imposed system of interest representation is designed to suppress, if not overcome.

In short, as we attempt to put together speculatively some hypotheses as to the contexts in which this state corporatism response emerges and the possible range of variation and sequences of implantation it may encompass, we are not likely to get much help from its manifest theorists-apologists, as we did in the case of societal corporatism.

There is, fortunately one interesting exception: Mihai Manolesco. Manolesco was a sort of Salazar manqué. A professor of political economy (although an engineer by training) and minister of commerce and industry for a short period in his native Rumania, he wrote Le Siècle du Corporatisme and its companion work, Le Parti Unique, after his political career had been cut short and published them in Paris. In the former he not only advanced his cosmic prediction about the ineluctable future of corporatism, but he supported his position with a complex, if schematic, argument — elements of which are strikingly modern.

First Manolesco asserts (other corporatist theorists to the contrary notwithstanding) that his conception of this system of interest representation — actually he presents it as a complete system of political domination — has nothing to do, institutionally or ideationally, with an imagined revival of Catholic or medieval practices. Not only does he doubt the existence of natural harmony in such ancien régime, but he accepts as definitive and desirable the rupture performed by nineteenth-century liberalization and capitalist development. His argument, then, is rigorously secular and, in his view, both progressive and realistic, looking forward prospectively rather than backward nostalgically.

Second, Manolesco makes his case on materialist grounds. While convinced, like Durkheim, that properly constructed corporations would provide the answer to overcoming modern man’s moral and spiritual malaise, integrating him into society through new communal bonds, the imperative forces leading to corporatiza-

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tion were to be found in the political economy of his time, in the nature of ownership, production and distribution of capitalism itself. In fact, at several reprisals, Manolesco approvingly cites Marx, although in general he regards him as theorist of the past rather than the present century.

Third, Manolesco denies that corporatism is merely a temporary defense mechanism for the mobilization and/or protection of class egoism which will somehow fade away when the conjunctural threat has passed. Rather, he presents it as a permanent institutional form, not intrinsically beholden to any social class or even to the maintenance of the status quo, capable of subduing particular interests to overriding national goals and eventually of transforming the capitalist basis of society itself.

In contemporary parlance, Manolesco was a theorist of “external dependence.” While he occasionally hints at essentially internal political conditions, for example, “premature” radicalization of the working class through ideological diffusion, fragmentation and loss of nerve on the part of the bourgeoisie, urban-rural tensions, decline of local and regional loyalties, that might contribute to provoking a corporatist response, its essential “reason for becoming” lies in the system of unequal international exchange.

Just as Marx’s theory leads us to understand the social phenomena of the capitalist worlds and especially that of exploitation by classes, this theory of international exchange makes us understand the inequality between peoples and relations of exploiter and exploited that connect them. [1936:30]

Corporatism, as he understood and advocated it, is an institutional-political response to a particular process of transformation that the world political economy and its attendant system of international stratification is presently undergoing. Its “dominant cause” lies in the relations between peoples, rather than between classes within national units. In fact the latter are conditioned, if not determined, by the former. The entire spectrum of political forces has shifted: “The Nineteenth Century knew the economic solidarity of class. The Twentieth will know the economic solidarity of nations.” [1936:35]

According to Manolesco, the dynamic element in this process of world economic transformation consists of a radical “national” demand for restructuring the international division of labor and its distribution of benefits. Peripheral capitalist nations are becoming
increasingly aware of the disparity in returns generated by their exchange of raw materials and foodstuffs for the manufactured goods produced by the advanced, earlier developing economies and are beginning to implement new national economic policies, especially ones aiming at import-substituting industrialization and control of foreign trade. This diffusion of industrialization and policy techniques was greatly accelerated by World War I, but is an autonomous secular trend which can be expected to continue on throughout the century. In essence and embryo, Manoilescu anticipated the general arguments and even many of the specific points of what twenty years later came to be known as the ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America of the United Nations) doctrine or, even later, the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) position.

To this, he added a second, more static observation: the end of territorial expansion. The twentieth century, he felt, would see the exhaustion of both open internal frontiers and manifest external imperialism. While he by no means could be credited with foreseeing the formal decolonization of Africa and Asia (his perspective was strictly Eurocentric), he did see that the international system had in a physical sense filled out existing space. Borders and loyalties were becoming fixed; territoriality from being a variable had become a constant. Economic, social and political problems would have to be tackled and especially organized with constant, zero-sum parameters.

These compound changes in international relations—the collapse of the prewar liberal economic order, the rising demand for equality of benefit and status between nation-states, the definitive demarcation of territoriality—provided the materialistic (and speculative) foundations for Manoilescu's ideology of defensive, nationalistic modernization from above. Each national unit, each state, must henceforth act exclusively as its own agent in its own interests and with its own resources, bargaining continually for survival and self-interest in a dangerous and unstably equilibrated international system. Nineteenth-century assumptions about liberty and initiative in the pursuit of individual self-interest and the benevolent, self-corrective operation of free and competitive markets and political processes were no longer valid. As a consequence of these new tensions between central and peripheral capitalisms and between all autarkically minded nation-states, the twentieth century would impose new conceptions of justice and forms of political organization.

Corporatism, he argued, would be one of, if not the institutional response to these imperatifs de l'époque. It alone would permit the state to fulfill the new functions which were being thrust upon public policy by external exigences. It would emerge first where those imperatives and tensions were the strongest, the southeastern and southern periphery of Europe, but once successful there, it would compel similar transformations in the organizational structure and policy practices of the earlier developing, liberal-pluralist systems.

But why corporatism? Why this particular set of sous-instruments de l’État as Manoilescu unflinchingly called them? His arguments are multiple, if not equally convincing and consistent.

1) Such corporations would fill out a continuous hierarchy of authority, thereby providing the isolated and impotent individual with a set of well-defined intermediary ranks and loyalties "dragging him into society" à la Durkheim and offering the political system the means "to resolve from a unitary and logical point of view all the specialized problems posed by the complex relations between the individual and the state." [1936:74] To do this, Manoilescu noted, these new units of representation would have to be intégral, not just cover economic interests as in Fascist Italy, but spiritual and moral ones as well.

2) The functional specialization of corporations would be "technologically self-determining" dividing the polity into vertical units of interest aggregation which in turn would enhance the role of technical expertise, depersonalize leadership and bring out naturally balanced interdependencies between issue areas. Most importantly and specifically, they would facilitate the expanding role of the state in national economic planning and international economic bargaining.

3) By devolving authority from the state to "neatly defined," "never contradictory," and "preestablished" interest hierarchies, the state would be relieved of decisional and implementational responsibility over "nonessential" matters (welfare, health, etc.) and could then devote more attention and effort to such "essential" tasks as internal security, external defense, foreign affairs, and national propaganda. In addition.

The multiplication of economic, cultural, intellectual and social functions of the state and the plurality of sources of public power creates a new function for gives
greater scope to a function already existing in embryonic form which we refer to as the function of arbitration and coordination of all national activities. The imperative of our time obliges the state to recognize these conflicts of collective interests; they must be solved by the state. And they make the state the most active and solicited of arbitrators. [1936:111]

4) Corporatism through its compartmentalization vertical pillaring and internal hierarchy of authority would provide an antidote to the "spirit of class." This latter, outmoded form of "horizontal consciousness" would be replaced by the new spirit of national solidarity and functionally interdependent organization.

Despite the fact that corporate consciousness is presently weak, it will always triumph in the end. Because in the limited world we are entering today, solidarity and organization are imperatives for survival, there will be no place for artificial social differences. Or, differences of class are mostly artificial and temporary, linked to the exceptional circumstances of the nineteenth century. [1936:107.4]

While Manolesco implies that this "benevolent" ninety-degree switch in the polarities of group consciousness would begin in the periphery and come as the result of, rather than the prerequisite for, the forceful implantation of state corporatism, he hints that it will be subsequently transmitted to the center where its adoption will be more spontaneous and voluntary.

In Western Europe, the owning class and the working class will draw together, impelled by the common danger they both face equally of witnessing the collapse of the industrial superiority from which they have both benefited. [1936:108]

Tactically speaking, Manolesco observes that in the short run "the best way to vanquish the actual antagonism of classes is to recognize it," that is, to incorporate "separate but equal" (forderen) representations of owners and workers within the same corporation, but in the long run it will no longer be necessary to provide even such a simulated equilibrium, given the projected disappearance of class identification. [1936:108-9]

5) One reason Manolesco was able to shift-pedal the coercive, authoritarian aspects of the transition to state corporatism was his belief that the twentieth century would see a major change in "the scales of moral and social values" held by citizens and subjects. The past century's ideals of individual equality and liberty would be replaced by new collective goals of social justice, based on differential rights and obligations according to the functional importance of one's role in society; and the goal of organization would place consensual restrictions on mutual activity in return for security and higher productivity. Both of these new idées de l'époque would, of course, have to be made compatible with and subordinate to the highest ideal of all, that "indisputable criterion," which Manolesco exclaimed in a burst of totalitarian rhetoric to mean that: "All that conforms to the national interest is just; all that is contrary to that interest is unjust." [1936:110]

As complex and suggestive (if schematic and deformed by wishful thinking) as these hypotheses may be, Manolesco is much less explicit about the politics and the specific decisional sequence involved in the transition toward this new form of interest representation. Pure (read, societal) corporatism, he conceded three years later, can only be attained after the widespread development of "corporate consciousness" and such a high degree of national integration that "old" and "artificial" class and partisan loyalties had eroded or, at least, severely eroded. This, he admits, is a long way off and, in the meantime, those "imperatives of the epoch" demand action, especially in the periphery. There, subordinate corporatism is the only answer: "It is natural that the corporations must be held in tutelage. The indicated tutor...is the single party...for a transitory period. [1937:134]

In the present absence of comparative case studies, it is not easy to evaluate the merits of Manolesco's prototheory of the emergence of state corporatism, or to elaborate further upon it. In a very general way, there seems to be a correspondence between the context of peripheral, delayed-dependent capitalism; awareness of relative underdevelopment; resentment against inferior international status; desire for increased national economic and political autonomy; extension of state control through regulatory policies, sectoral planning and public enterprise; emergence of a more professionalized and achievement-oriented situs of civil servants; and the forced corporatization of interest representation from above. Manolesco's belated remarks on the specific instrumentality responsible for this change have been less well confirmed. In no case was the single ruling party the primary or exclusive tutelary
transformation has yet to be found.

Marx once suggested that societies only recognized the problems they stood some chance of resolving. From this optimistic perspective, renewed awareness that we may still be in the century of corporatism should contribute to making it the shortest century on historical record.

The next century, that of syndicalism, already awaits its Lord Keynes or its Mikhail Manoïlesco!

NOTES

3. To this essay I have appended a reference bibliography of some 100 titles which seem important in understanding the ideological and praxiological bases of corporatism up to and including the interwar period.
4. For excellent critical treatments of corporativism in the 1930's, see Roland Pére, Louis Robinsek-Franck, 1934, and François Perroux, 1937, 27-178.

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8. Such reasoning has been particularly prevalent among Anglo-Saxon students of Latin America where, from the start, these area specialists seem to have drawn the following syllogism: "Latin Americans behave differently from North Americans; Latin America was colonized by Spain and Portugal; North America by Great Britain; Latin Americans are Catholics, North Americans are predominantly Protestant; ergo, Latin Americans behave differently from North Americans because of their Catholic-Iberian heritage!"

The few systematically comparative studies of attitudes which have included both Latin and North American samples have generally concluded that once one controls for education, class, center-periphery residence, age, etc., residual differences that could be assigned specifically to culture are statistically insignificant. See especially Joseph Kahl, The Measurement of Modernity (Austin, Texas, 1968).

9. It is also worth mentioning that many, if not most, of the theorists of modern corporatism have not been Catholics. Many were in fact militarily secular. Even those who most publicly claimed to be inspired by "Social Christian" ideals, such as Salazar and Dollfus, followed a much more bureaucratist, statist and authoritarian praxis. Also worth stressing is that among "Social Christians" or more broadly, progressive Catholics, not all by any means advocated corporatism. Such prominent figures as Jacques Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier opposed it. See Henry Goiter, Le Catholicisme Social (Paris, 1947).

Also worth mentioning is that corporatism has been considered quite compatible with many non-Catholic, non-Iberian cultures. See, for example, Samuel H. Beer, British Politics in the Collectivist Age (New York, 1969) and Thomas Anton, "Policy-Making and Political Culture in Sweden," Scandinavian Political Studies, 10 (1970), 25-61.


In subsequent conversations with this author, Linc has advanced and defended the idea of an "organic state model" as the appropriate framework for the discussion of corporatism. See also the essay cited above (n. 2) by James Malloy.

13. Emile Louis, Organisations et representations corporatives (Johannesburg, 1952), a translation of his Le Societe d'Ancien Régime (Bruxelles, 1943).
14. F. Charles Fourier, Théories de l'Unité Universelle (1822) and Le Nouveau Monde industriel et socialiste (1829).
19. For example, Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation* (Berkeley, 1968) — where in all fairness the concept of corporatism itself does not appear. In an essay by Martin Heisler, however, these "pillared" notions are expressly linked to a corporatist model of European politics: "Patterns of European Politics: The 'European Pecly' Model," in M. Q. Heisler et al., *Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes* (New York, 1974).

20. Roland Hunsfeld, for example, argues that it is precisely social and economic homogenization that contributes to the thoroughness of Swedish corporatism; see the New Testamentarian (New York, 1972), pp. 89-87. Also Olaf Rain, *Participation, Corporatization and Political Trends in Present-day Sweden* (Paper presented at Sixth Annual Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Scandinavian Study, New York, May 3-6, 1972).

21. On the contrary, a recent analysis of Belgium's constitutional structure argues persuasively that multipateln conflicts in that polity serve to sustain a more pluralistic (i.e., nonmonopolistic, competitive, overlapping) system of interest representation; see A. Van Den Brande, "Voluntary Associations in the Belgian Political System 1954-1962," *Res Publica*, no. 2 (1973), pp. 329-336.

22. At this point it is perhaps worth repeating that this constructed definition does not correspond to any of the ones advanced by specifically corporatist theorists. Moreover, it ignores a number of institutional and behavioral dimensions they tended to stress. For example, it does not specify the existence of singular associations (corporations) grouping both employers and workers. These rarely exist and where they have been formally established — Portugal, Spain and Italy — they do not function as unities. Nor does it say anything about the presence of a higher council or parliament composed of functional or professional representatives. Many polities which are not otherwise very corporatist, France or West Germany, have such a Conseil Economique et Social or Wirtschaftsrat, many heavily corporatist countries which do have them, e.g., Portugal, do not grant them decisional authority. Nor does the definition suggest that corporatist associations will be the only constituent units of the polity — completely displacing territorial entities, parties and movements. (All existing corporate systems, parties and territorial subdivisions continue to exist and various youth and religious movements may not only be tolerated but encouraged.) These institutional aspects as well as the more important behavioral issues of how and who would form the unique and hierarchical associations, would be their degree of autonomy from state control and whether whole spheres really could bring about class harmony and constitute a tertium genus between communism and capitalism were the subject of extensive debate and considerable fragmentation among corporatist ideologues.

23. Actually, the concept is more "a constructed type" than an ideal type. The former has been defined as: "a purposive, combination, and (sometimes) accentuation of a set of criteria with empirical referents that serves as a basis for comparison of empirical cases" (John C. McKelvey, Constructive Typology and Social Theory (New York, 1966), p. 3).


28. The quotations are all from *The Federalist Papers*, no. 10.

29. See especially the article by Carl Alpenitz and works cited therein (1973) even though the author associates his proposals with the tide of pluralism, rather than that of syndicalism. Also Ivanovsk Vanek, *The Participatory Economy* (Ithaca, 1971).


37. Schmitter, "Corporatist Interest Representation and Public Policy-Making in Portugal."

38. Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil* and "The Portugueseization of Brazil."
46  Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation


Something approaching the corporatist model has been implicitly and not explicitly advanced in describing certain “degenerate” varieties of totalitarianism (“par- tialitarian”) role in other Eastern European polities: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania, even the U.S.S.R. itself. For an intelligent survey and critique of this literature, and its pluralistic paradigm, see Andrew Janos, “Group Politics in Communist Society: A Second Look at the Pluralistic Model” in S. P. Huntington and C. H. Moore, eds. (1970), pp. 53-70.

44. In an even wider range of polities, authors have suggested that parts, if not substantial portions, of the interest group universe can be described as “corporatist”; e.g., the United States: Grant McConnell (1966); Theodore Lowi (1965); Great Britain: Samuel Beer (1963); Western Germany: Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (London, 1968); Canada: Robert Presthus, *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics* (New York, 1973); France: Suzanne Berger, *Corporate Organization: The Case of a French Rural Association* in J. Perneck and J. Chapman (eds.), *Voluntary Associations* (New York, 1969), pp. 263-84.

45. These hypotheses about the functioning of pluralist systems are developed further and contrasted with corporatist ones in my “Inventory of Analytical Pluralist Propositions,” unpublished MS of Chicago, 1971.


47. Manuelzo also noted the existence of “muted corporatism” combining the two ideal-types.

48. João Manuel Cortez Pinto, *A Corporação* (Coimbra, 1953); also José Pires Cardoso, *Questões Corporativas* (Lisbon, 1958). A somewhat similar distinction, but one which placed primary emphasis on its role in furthering class collaboration by different means, is François Perroux’s between corporatism in a strict sense and corporatism in a strict sense [1937:7-19].

49. Actually, Nazi Germany is an ambiguous case. For an excellent analysis of the struggles involving competing conceptions of interest politics and the eventual demise of corporatist tendencies after 1936 in that policy, see Arthur Schütz, *Big Business in the Third Reich* (Bloomington, Indiana, 1964).

50. For the theoretical model underlying these distinctions between “structural conduciveness” and “precipitating factors,” see Neil Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York, 1963).

51. Incumbency prevents me from even speculating about the tendencies toward corporatization which appear to exist among societies with a quite different system of economic exploitation, namely, bureaucratic-centralized socialism. For an initial treatment of these issues, see the excellent article by James (1970) and the works discussed therein.

52. The much later discussion of these issues in the United States was, as might be expected, even more privatist and statist as that of Keynes. For a critical evaluation of this literature, see Hal Draper “Neo-corporatism and neo-reformism,” *New Politics* (Fall, 1961), pp. 87-106.

53. *A study which illustrates this particularly well in a nicely controlled cultural and developmental setting is Nils Evander, “Collective Bargaining and Incomes Policy in the Nordic Countries: A Comparative Analysis” (Paper prepared for delivery at the APSA Annual Meeting, New Orleans, Sept. 4-8, 1973).

54. The work from which this primitive sequential account is drawn [Kramer, 1954, 54-65] leaves off in 1954. No doubt further private-public interpenetration has occurred since then.

55. Not all treatments of the emergence of societal corporatism place as much emphasis as I do on the role of advanced capitalism and the imperative transformation it forces on the modern state. Hunsford [1972:87] for example, places most of his explanatory emphasis on the traditional agricultural system of Sweden, the role of temperature societies and a particular type of industrial settlement (bokå). Thomas J. Anten bases his argument on a distinctive “Swedish policy-making style and elite culture” ([1969:92-93].

56. Shonfield goes on to remark: “It is curious how close this kind of thinking was to the corporatist theories of the earlier writers of Italian fascism, who flourished in the 1920’s. Corporatism got its bad name, which has stuck to it, essentially because of its association with the one-party state” (p. 231).

57. “The corporatist form of organization seems to be almost second nature to the Australians. It is not that they are undemocratic; they nearly all belong to their business and professional associations, their trade unions, their religious and other groups, indeed membership in some of them is compulsory. And the Government is in turn under legal compulsion to consult these organizations before it takes legislative or administrative action of certain specified kinds” ([1965:193-94].

58. “It is interesting to find the old corporatist ideal which was deeply embedded in Italian pre-war thinking — the ideal of a balanced and responsible economic group with quasi-sovereign powers administering itself — cropping up again in this new guise” [1965:192].

59. “In Sweden there is a society in which interest groups are so strongly organized, their democratic basis so firm and their habit of bargaining with each one another independently of the government so well established... (yet) the Swedish Government still manages to act in a decisive fashion when circumstances require... it just happens that it is the Swedish way to treat the process of government as being in large part an extended dialogue between experts drawn from a variety of bodies, official and unofficial, whose views are expected to be merely tinged rather than finally shaped by those who pay their salaries” [1965:199-200].

60. “The remarkable willingness of the trade unions to collaborate actively in this policy of wage stabilization is to be explained by their anxiety about the future supply of jobs for their men” [1965:212].

61. “The general point is that German Verbands have traditionally seen themselves as performing an important public role, as guardians of the long-term interests of the nation’s industries, and they continue to do so. The development one observes since the war is that the approach to problems of policy has become more
consultative, with the emphasis on technical advice. Power and influence are still present; but the manner is different" (1965:245).


63. Shostak concentrates almost exclusively on the post-World War II period. Only in the case of the United States does he systematically probe further back. Is it just a coincidence that those European countries which were neutral in World War II moved more rapidly and thoroughly towards corporatization (except Austria), than the belligerents? Also worth exploring in greater detail are the diverse policy responses to the Great Depression — as our rapid sketch of the Netherlands illustrated.

64. A partial exception would have to be entered for the Fascists: Bettai, Bertolotto, Papi and Vico but not, for example, for Ugo Spirito who even went so far as to suggest that corporazione should replace both private individuals and the state as the basis for property and decision-making, thereby causing a minor scandal at the 1932 Ferrara Congress on Corporatism, Capitalismo e Corporazionismo, 3rd ed. (Florence, 1934). Interestingly, Spirito’s works have been recently reprinted.

65. For a brief description of his role in relation to Rumanian politics, see Andrew Janos, "The One-Party State and Social Mobilization: East Europe between the Wars" in S. Huntington and C. H. Moore, eds. (fn. 38), pp. 213-14.

66. In the following summary of his argument I will not cite specific page references, except in the case of direct quotes, since the elements of his position are frequently scattered rather widely and I have synthesized them freely. All quotes are from the 1936 edition.

67. This is the same author who thirty pages before had claimed: “Between the corporatist conception of the state and the pure individualist one, there is a certain coincidence in outcomes. Both systems result (abovementioned) in a minimal state” (1933).

68. This and the following generalizations about the praxis of state corporatism draw on my case studies of Brazil and Portugal. The Italian Fascist case, however, does not appear to differ markedly. See Roland Sarti, Fascism and Industrial Leadership in Italy, 1919-1940 (Berkeley, 1971).

69. The expression is from Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire. For a further development of these ideas, see August Thalheimer " Über den Faschismus" in O. Bauer et al., Faschismus und Kapitalismus (Frankfurt, 1967), pp. 19-38; H. C. F. Maxstia, Fascismus und andemationale Gesellschaft (Neuwied u. Berlin, 1971); and Nicos Poulantzas, Fascisme et dictature (Paris, 1970); also my "The Portugalisation of Brazil"

70. These conclusions about the difficulties inherent in the transformation from one type of corporatism to the other are based on the study I have conducted on Portuguese corporatism and are discussed more fully therein; see "Corporatist Interest Representation and Public Policy-Making in Portugal."

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