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# **TRAVELLING IN THE CZECH FUTURE**

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## **SURVEY OF PRINCIPAL FINDINGS**

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## Introduction

The study *Travelling in the Czech Future* presents principal outcomes of the work completed by the CESES team in 2002. **Both in terms of its content and methodology, it follows up with the CESES previous outputs**, the *Vision of Development of the Czech Republic until 2015* (Vize, 2001) and the *Guide to the Landscape of Priorities for the Czech Republic* (Pruvodce, 2002). The *Travelling in the Czech Future* (Putování, 2003) represents a dense work of more than 300 pages and therefore its summary cannot be brief either. Hopefully, this unpleasant fact will not discourage prospective readers from reflecting upon the *Travelling*, or the present résumé, and from considering to what extent the herein proposed ways to the Czech future might represent ways they would be willing, partially or completely, to share.

Or perhaps not to share. For the present work does not offer an *instant picture* of the future, much less *instant formulas* how to accomplish this picture. Similar to the authors, also the reader should approach the present work as an invitation to *travelling*, which is to say, as a search for ways in an unknown terrain. The study attempts at presenting three kinds of *instructions* in this terrain. Its objectives are as follows:

1. To map the **starting conditions** (Chapter 1). This means, firstly, the attitudes and expectations of citizens themselves towards their own future and towards the future of the country. These attitudes undoubtedly reflect both historical experience of the Czech society and its response to the current constellation of political and social forces. Secondly, it means systematically arranged information on future trends in the *external surroundings* with which the Czech society will be confronted;
2. To set **milestones of possible ways** in the form of strategic moves that we view as structured processes of social innovations and their implications, which significantly exceed the framework of common functioning of the country and society and qualitatively transform conditions or ways of life of the country, and demand a long-term concentration of resources and the will to attain the sought-after transformations (see Chapter 2). The strategic moves represent – in addition to the priority problems and strategic concepts outlined in the *Guide to the Landscape of Priorities* – another level of generalization. Specifically, these are the following strategic moves: Cultivation of Knowledge into a Key Factor of Production; System of Comprehensive Security Management in the Czech Republic; Activation of Territorial Communities; Ways of Development of Social Cohesion and National and Civic Identity. Strategic moves certainly do not form a closed system: it is probable that in the future they will be completed with other, so far unprocessed, moves. At the same time, we must take into account that these moves might, and will, be exposed to the influence of numerous autonomous flows in the society. The strategic moves are therefore succeeded by a reflection upon the modernization of democracy as a precondition of their implementation;

3. To outline **pros and cons** of possible developmental ways of the Czech society in the form of stories of alternative futures, scenarios (see Chapter 3). The fundamental distinguishing criterion of the three scenarios offered here is always a single-track emphasis on one of the three criteria of possible future developments of the Czech Republic: it is the quality of life (*To Survive at Peace and Calm or to Get Going?*), the sustainability of life (*Bohemia and Moravia – The Garden of Europe*) and the economic growth (*The Czech Republic as a Central-European Tiger*). These scenarios attempt at presenting complete and – despite all their extremities – as much credible as possible hypotheses that are to encourage reflections and demonstrate that our future is both unknown and open and that it largely depends on us, on our decisions and qualifications, on the nature of goals we set for ourselves and on the ways by which these goals are to be attained.

First and foremost, however, the present study aims to provoke further **discussions on the future development of the Czech state and society**. That is, only then will all of us *travel*. And that is why we also welcome both critical reflections on the study as a whole and on its individual parts and proposals for further elaboration on the subjects and methods of the **systematic forecasting and programming** of the development of the Czech Republic in the ever-transforming world, including proposals for solutions of their institutional aspects, based on assessments of the existing practice. These issues are dealt with in a separate supplement to the *Travelling*.



## 1 POINTS OF DEPARTURE

### 1.1 Life Strategies of the Population of the Czech Republic

What sorts of changes do people living their everyday lives in our society really want? Do the ordinary citizens wish for the same changes as those changes prepared for them by experts on forecasting, and are they interested in transforming their futures at all? And if so, in what ways? What are their individual and common (collective) strategies of improving their life conditions and life quality in our society? Do they have any at all? Do they have their own individual and collective visions, do they know the right ways to their objectives, do they know how to proceed and what resources their progress on these ways will require? Are individual visions in agreement with collective ones, or do they rather tend to contradict each other? Are we dealing here with one collective strategy common to everybody, or is there a number of strategies competing with one another? And if there is a plurality of collective strategies, which groups of population stand up for them and what are they willing to do in order to accomplish them?

Citizens' opinions and answers to the aforementioned questions were acquired by means of a questionnaire-based representative enquiry whose "terrain phase" was carried out in cooperation with the GfK Praha Company.<sup>1</sup> The results of this enquiry, or better to say their interpretations, are structured into two larger sections:

1. Character, content and instruments of the implementation of collective strategies of the development of the Czech Republic in the eyes of its citizens.
2. Character, content and instruments of the implementation of individual life strategies.

The first section is based on the presumption that after the fall of the communist regime the Czech Republic found itself in a situation in which it had to solve tasks of a double transformation:

- Transformation in the sense of a return back among democratic societies governed by market economy and the rule of law,
- Transformation of the obsolescent industrial society into a modern society, i.e. into the post-industrial, information, knowledge etc. society.

To simplify this, the first transformation might be referred to as *consolidation* whereas the second one as *modernization*.

**Consolidation** of political, economic and legal conditions undoubtedly represents a necessary precondition of further developments of a society. According to a majority of interviewed

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<sup>1</sup> The dates of the terrain data collection: April 26 – May 20, 2002  
 The age of respondents: over 15 years old  
 Enquiry methods: one-to-one interviews  
 Sampling methods: random stratified selection (Random Address)  
 Number of completed interviews: 2498  
 Recoverability: 70,2 %

people, however, this prerequisite of modernization has not been properly completed yet. Two thirds of the population maintain the position that today we still do not live in capitalism. Our society still operates in a sort of a peculiar *post communist* manner characterized by the absence of open and fair economic and political competition and by the insufficient enforcement of civic rights. The today's Czech society is defined by life in debt, a high level of corruption in state administration and the excessive power of media – this is a predominant evaluation of the 12-year consolidation of our society. The Czechs therefore think that the economic transformation and the transformation of political and legal systems still cannot accommodate the parameters required for further modernization of the country.

Looking at the present situation, the Czech public simply reflects on what the experts have been trying to draw attention to for quite some time, but what a large segment of the political scene has refused to acknowledge. The underdevelopment, or the absence, of the institutional and moral framework for the operation of market and political system largely condition the future social-economic growth and contribute to our falling behind the modern world. This belief is also confirmed by the fact that almost two thirds (64%) of respondents consider the overall development of our society to be too slow in comparison with the other advanced countries.

As for **modernization** processes, it becomes obvious that an overwhelming majority of Czech citizens (82%) have quite a clear idea of what a modern society should look like. Only a minority (18 %) of respondents expressed rather vague ideas or could not imagine at all what the modern society stands for. It appeared that respondents' answers referred both to earlier, material and technical, elements of modernization, and to contemporary, humanistic and socially oriented, elements of modernization. However, the earlier elements, characterizing rather the industrial era of modern society, substantially prevail.

On the whole, we can therefore conclude that the citizens of the Czech Republic might have noticed current modernization trends and have reflected on them, nevertheless, their ideas are still more deeply rooted in the model of the *vanishing* industrial society of *smoking chimneys* rather than in the contemporary model of the information or knowledge society and reflective modernization (i.e. a modernization in which humanistic and civic aspects of development stand in the foreground).

The enquiry thus reveals that the Czech public has primarily formed its majority opinion in technical orientation, expert management, regulations of civic life, as well as egalitarianism. According to a majority of respondents, the ideal Czech society should seek technical progress rather than spiritual development. Experts, and not the public, should have the main say. The society should impose order on life of citizens rather than give them a long leash. It should primarily take care of steady progress of all the people rather than of a handful of outstanding talents.

The Czech society is obviously split in its opinions of the dynamics of an ideal society, i.e. in its fundamental orientation towards performance and innovation. One half of respondents give

preference to the highest possible economic performance in the orientation of the society, but 42 % respondents favour peaceful life. And, similarly, one half of respondents give preference to modernization changes, but two-fifths favour the observance of traditions. These answers indicate that we have to face two dominant visions of the modern society dynamics. The question is whether these ideals can be reconciled or whether we are going to keep building a sort of a *two-speed* society.

The above stated findings have both optimistic and manifestly warning aspects. On one hand, we can expect that our society will place more weight on such principles as, for instance, expertise, productivity and effectiveness, which may bring us success in the international modernization competition and, consequently, greater prosperity. On the other hand, however, there is also a danger that those who are not dynamic, educated and flexible enough will be marked as free riders of the modernization process and will be expelled to the margins of social life.

Modernization brings along a number of other risks as well. Even today many people consider the pace of life in contemporary Czech society too fast. As a consequence, they are stressed and lose the sense of orientation in their lives. The majority (58 %) of respondents also believe that the Czech society has been transforming so fast that they are hardly able to follow this progress. And, according to a majority opinion (61 %), for the ordinary citizen the life in contemporary society is too complex and difficult to handle. From this point of view we already have a *turbo society*. That is why it is quite justifiable to ask, how will the ordinary citizen manage an even higher life pace in such a model of society to which a larger part of the population aspires?

The already widespread feelings of disorientation are further enhanced by the fact that a considerable part of the population does not trust its elites, both in terms of their meritorious abilities and their morals. One half of respondents believe that the development of our society has got out of control of state authorities and the same number of people sharply perceive the danger that the country might be ruled by a small group of politicians bribed by large companies. Also *thanks* to this, on one hand, more than one half (57 %) of the questioned citizens think that no one in fact knows where our society is heading. On the other hand, more than one half of respondents (56 %) are convinced that interests of world powers had long ago predetermined the development of our society. Only in a disoriented society can the chaotic and conspiracy scenarios of social development (mutually excluding each other) coexist side by side without losing their explicatory potential for citizens.

In this situation it is not surprising that within the Czech public the question has not been unequivocally answered as to which of the **two ways of modernization** (*westernization* or the *Czech model of modernization*) is to be followed. The Czech public may largely hold the opinion that there is no other way but to follow the path of westernization, however, the majority of respondents also proclaim that the Czechs and Moravians can contribute and enrich western models of social development. According to a majority opinion (69 %), the

west could learn many things from us despite its more advanced economy. Nevertheless, so far it has not been clarified in what spheres we could actually enrich western modernization models.

Two fifths of respondents do not acknowledge the necessity to follow the western path at all and refuse to accept the idea of modernization of our country as a project of its modernization. They proclaim that it would not make sense to imitate the modernization process of western countries. At the same time, however, the fact that no model of *Czech-style modernization* has been developed yet brings about discomfiture.

As far as the **priorities** of modernization are concerned, we can infer that the population of the Czech Republic inclines towards the most practicable way of modernization: a compromise between the orientation to technology and the orientation to culture. At this point we cannot determine yet whether the inhabitants will incline towards a comprehensive type of modernization due to their rational reasoning or due to their intuition and present-day experience. And it is quite legitimate to raise the question: how come, that the need of comprehensive modernization and its public support have not been recognized by political elites in time?

To a certain extent, the answer to this question can be looked for in compromising attitudes of the Czech public to the objectives our country should be pursuing in the oncoming ten or fifteen years. It is a question of deciding between the consumerist and humane orientations of society. Two thirds (65 %) of the questioned citizens are in favour of mixed consumerist (material) and humane priorities. In accordance with the aforementioned generally accepted vision of an ideal society, however, the respondents give a significant preference to the order and material well being over the participation and freedom of the individual. One quarter (26 %) of respondents resolutely opt for material priorities and consider the state stability and fight against increasing prices the most important objectives. On the contrary, only 9 % of the questioned people advocate an entirely humane orientation and prioritise the defence of freedom of speech and higher participation of citizens in the decision-making process. A bigger participation of public also entails bigger pressure on the conduct of elites. And if the concern to enlarge and exploit public participation is not strong enough, there is no wonder that the elites can only hardly recognize modernization trends and rather prefer to consolidate their attained positions.

Since the mid 1990's, many commentators on the Czech political scene have been heard on numerous occasions that the weak point of the contemporary political representation is its inability to provide its electors with a clear vision of social development. It is hard to say whether this is caused by the fact that due to the globalization and fast pace of life the social development has indeed got out of control of politicians or whether it is just a matter of their indolence fostered by low political culture of citizens. Nevertheless, it holds true that the majority of population does want to know the direction, content and horizons of our common future. It even seems that they long to find a **common vision of the future development of**

**our society.** Over two thirds (69 %) of the respondents stated that we lack such a vision. In their opinion, *to pull at the same end of the rope* is the most efficient strategy of the modernization of society.

The question remains, however, how to push forward our common vision of modernization. In this respect, the existence of strong authoritarian tendencies is documented by the finding that up to 45% respondents wish to have, instead of parliamentary polemics, a powerful political leader who would establish order. The respondents' ideas of an ideal society suggest that this leader should be a dispassionate and incorruptible technocrat rather than a hot-tempered nationalist. The combination of a powerful leader and a grand vision indicates that the Czech society contains considerable potential to set off on such a modernization path that would be characterized by the logic of a great upswing rather than by the logic of small steps and little work tasks.

However, collectively conceived modernization transformations are not endangered by extremism so much as they are by the population's indifference. Over one quarter (29 %) of the questioned would like to let our society develop peacefully in its own way. The problem of the implementation of modernization transformations in the Czech Republic is indeed the **civic and political culture of its inhabitants**, strongly afflicted by egalitarianism and state paternalism. The influence of state paternalism is illustrated by the opinion of one half (52 %) of the questioned maintaining that public problems are to be solved by the state, in the first place, and not by citizens themselves. Two fifths (41 %) of respondents, however, disagree with this view, which again signals a considerable disunity in the attitudes of the Czech public to possible modernization strategies of the country. Nevertheless, it holds true that in the eyes of a majority of Czech citizens the state plays the central role in the country's development and that they even wish to strengthen this role. Responding to the question as to whose influence upon the orientation of our society should be greater than it is nowadays, the respondents most frequently mentioned authorities, i.e. municipal authorities (68 %), courts (62 %) and the Government (56 %). Private enterprises and companies received over one half of preferences. Discussions and solutions of problems of the future modernization of our society should be therefore, according to responses, conducted through the interaction of authorities and enterprisers in the first place. Only then should trade unions and voluntary (civic) organizations have their say (over two fifths of respondents would like to strengthen their influence). At this point the supremacy of the technocratic principle over the participation principle has again become manifest.

A successful implementation of any collective strategy requires that all its propagators believe in its success, i.e. they are optimistically tuned and, at the same time, willing to bring sacrifice for its successful implementation.

When looking into the future, the Czech public holds **predominantly optimistic** outlooks. Three fifths (60 %) of respondents expect the Czech Republic to improve its standing over the next fifteen years (and even if it does not make it among the foremost states in the world and

EU, it should at least move to a better position). Less than a quarter (24 %) of the questioned take a sceptical attitude, believing that the Czech Republic will remain approximately on the same level as it is today. Overt pessimism is characteristic of mere 8 % respondents. At this point it is quite legitimate to ask where the majority of population draw optimism from if, on the other hand, they **do not trust their fellow-citizens** to have a good will to contribute to the implementation of this strategy. A majority (57 %) of the questioned are convinced that the citizens of the Czech Republic are not willing to bring sacrifice for the sake of a better common future.

Are indeed the Czechs and the Moravians such untrustworthy egoists, as they themselves tend to think about their fellow-citizens? It will not come as a surprise that the majority of respondents have a certain will to bring sacrifice, or at least declare to have it! It is more surprising, however, that in spite of the problems with disorientation in the rapidly changing world the citizens are willing – for the sake of modernization bringing prosperity – to sacrifice the remains of their peace and comfort. The extent of determination to accelerate the pace of life even more is quite substantial. Almost three quarters (73 %) of respondents proclaim they would support modernization even if it necessitated frequent retraining, 59 % agree with an increased working pace for the sake of modernization, and 42 % would not mind moving because of work.

On the other hand, the modernization would have to face tough resistance if it brought about a wave of immigration from the East. In that case 88 % respondents would not approve of it. If the modernization produced higher unemployment rates, it would be refused by three quarters (77 %) of respondents. And for three quarters of respondents the expelling of certain social groups to the margins of society would be a sufficient reason for turning down the modernization. Behind these examples of negative reactions there is a threat of social conflicts that the thinking of a common citizen refuses to accept. The idea of modernization inducing conflicts and disturbing social solidarity of society is at variance with historical experience of an overwhelming majority of the population. The reason is that in the recent history of older generations it was just the modernization (industrialization) that kept producing more and more jobs and for a long time caused the precisely opposite problem, i.e. there were *no people* available for newly created jobs. Modernization had *always* been a safe play. And the idea that in the present situation it is not so and that, on the contrary, the attribute of modernization is **uncertainty** associated with the upsetting of broadly accepted social solidarity elicits in a majority of population a wave of solidarity that prevents this idea from being put into practice. It is obvious that the fate of modernization in the Czech Republic depends on whether it will get into conflict with solidarity. In that case a majority of population will rise in defence of solidarity against modernization.

The outcomes of our research reveal the willingness of a majority of population of the Czech Republic to bring sacrifices, in the form of their own comfort and peaceful life, to the alter of modernization. It is therefore apparent that these are sacrifices of a purely private nature. After all, retraining, moving the house and a better work performance are mostly private activities.

But would ordinary citizens of the Czech Republic be willing to engage in the public sphere, i.e. to risk singeing their feathers in front of the eyes of the others? Again, this is a rather vacillating situation. One half of respondents prefer such a life strategy that is favourable for life in peace, i.e. not stepping out of line too conspicuously in order not to get into unnecessary problems. Two fifths (42 %) of respondents, however, do not subscribe to this strategy. It is precisely this group of people who give the modernization in the Czech Republic a chance to become a reflective type of modernization, thoroughly discussed and negotiated in public. A majority (74 %) of population may be interested in the future due to their concern with the fate of the country in which they live, however, if this future is to be successful, it is necessary that their interest is strong enough to grow into activity. And again, the Czech society is split here: a moderate majority (53 %) of respondents are interested in the future of the country only a little or not at all, but a moderate minority (46 %) are interested in it sufficiently or very much. Even though one half of the population believes that the priority issue of the modernization of democracy is its greater opening up to citizens, a heavy burden of opportunistic attitudes such as, for instance: *let sleeping dogs lie if you can help it* tend to thwart hopes of the speedy accomplishment of the reflective phase of modernization.

Responsible citizens expecting the state to solve their common problems should be logically obliged to control the state and channel its decision-making. If a collective strategy is to be implemented by the state, the role of individual citizens is to exert pressure upon representatives of state institutions so that they would duly perform their commitments. The most common conventional form of influence is one's participation in elections to representative bodies. The results of the enquiry reveal that 50 % respondents go to the polls regularly, 25 % occasionally or exceptionally, and 23 % never go to the polls. Compared to the rest of Europe, these data can be regarded as average even though, as we know from statistical data on polls participation, the willingness of the population of the Czech Republic to go to the polls has been steadily decreasing over the recent years. This is also related to the fact that only one third of the questioned proclaim to be interested in politics more than *a little*, which is a significantly lower proportion compared to those who express their interest in the future of the Czech Republic. These attitudes testify not only to considerable mistrust of *high politics* but also to public disbelief in politicians' ability to implement a collective strategy of social modernization.

High politics by far does not exhaust the opportunities of citizens to participate in decision-making. The participation of the citizens of the Czech Republic in *sub politics* is significantly higher even though it is by no means illustriously high. Only 2 % of the questioned participate in sessions of local authorities regularly and 21 % participate occasionally or exceptionally. Mere 17 % of the interviewed venture in convincing authorities about the necessity to carry out certain changes and only 1 % do so regularly. Therefore neither in this case will the belief in the effectiveness of conventional participation be very high. Two thirds (65 %) of respondents are even convinced that their towns or villages have no influence whatsoever in the matters of decision-making.

To a certain extent, the widely experienced civic incompetence and resignation of a majority of population from influencing public affairs are in contrast with respondents' belief in their ability to influence their private success by their own endeavours – three quarters (77 %) of the interviewed believe that one can determine the extent of success in life. As if the respondents did not associate their private perspectives with the fate of the entire society or were hoping that the state would implement the strategy of social development that would be somehow both successful and acceptable for them.

Of course, the willingness to *put one's head over the parapet* and to participate in collective activities is closely linked to trust in people with whom one possibly might *get down to it*. This trust is lamentably low in this country. Only 18 % of the questioned voice their belief that a majority of people can be trusted. The deficit of mutual trust also entails the deficit of trust in common actions that many people offset with their almost unlimited trust in the abilities of experts, and give preference to the state-paid expertocracy over the participative democracy. The deficit of trust enlarges the gap between us and the modern society even more than our momentary lagging behind the technical progress. Most of the population is well aware of this fact and requires modernization efforts to put a greater emphasis on raising trust and solidarity among people (58 %), or calls for more space designed for civic participation (54 %). Without collective championing of these demands, however, it can be hardly expected that expertocrats would voluntarily give up their power. This produces a *vicious circle*: Citizens do not trust each other and therefore hardly ever participate in collective actions, but without any participation in collective or communal actions there is no place where their mutual trust might be formed, and that is why they do not trust each other. They are thrown back on the good will of expertocracy and their influence on the modernization strategy of the country thus remains very small. Also due to this fact our society is more likely to remind of a mass society of the industrial era of smoking chimneys, where the atomised masses were easily managed by closed elites, rather than of a modern information society characterized by critical reflection on scientification of society and by broad public participation in decision-making processes.

However, it would be unjust to claim that the citizens of the Czech Republic have completely delegated the care of public welfare to the state and experts. The civic culture in Bohemia and Moravia does not only have a passive dimension. In addition to a certain degree of both conventional and unconventional political participation, our inquiry registered quite a high level of *apolitical* commitment to the public good. One half (49 %) of the interviewed citizens state that they occasionally or exceptionally support a beneficent (charitable) campaign. The next 6 % support this sort of campaigns regularly. Over one half (56 %) of the questioned made a (financial or non-monetary) contribution to charity last year. A considerable part of the population is also engaged in volunteerism. One third (31 %) of respondents do unpaid work (at least exceptionally) for a volunteer organization. Last year 27 % respondents performed this type of work at least once. Moreover, volunteers also worked in organizations of other types: 15 % respondents worked in local authorities, 9 % in private companies and 2 % in state authorities. A majority of population, however, perceives their volunteer and charitable



activities as a sort of compensation for deficits in the welfare state rather than as a natural expression of civic maturity.

The search for a collective vision of development is closely linked to the nature, content and instruments of **individual life strategies**.

First of all: How does our population orientate itself as a whole on the *time axis*? The outcomes of our enquiry reveal that in the population of the Czech Republic there is a majority (30 %) of those who turn to the past (the best part of their lives is gone), only a little fewer (27 %) respondents turn to the future (the best in their lives is yet to come) while the markedly smallest number of people (16 %) *live at present* (they think they are enjoying the best part of their lives right now). But we must also take into consideration the fact that over one fifth of the questioned said they never think along these lines at all.

However, another question is how intensely people's everyday behaviour is permeated with their ideas about what they are expecting from the future. The extent to which an expected course of events is allowed to organize our present life is also dependent on how bold outlines our ideas of the future have. It is also important if these ideas are but hazy visions or quite clear and specific plans, and whether these plans are perceived as noncommittal or as quite binding. The influence of the future can be therefore also assessed by the importance attributed by individuals to the planning of their private lives. It follows that, based on the acquired data, three fifths of respondents regard planning in their lives as definitely, or rather important, whereas two fifths of the respondents stated that planning is rather or definitely unimportant (but only 5 % consider planning completely unimportant). Planning, as an active orientation to the future, is very closely linked to the belief that individuals themselves can influence to what extent they will be successful in their lives. The interviewed citizens who believe to be able to influence their own success consider planning to be much more important than those (fatalists) who give up the planning of their future in advance. Duly appreciation of the importance of planning is also significantly connected with either optimistic or pessimistic expectations of what the future will bring us. 80 % optimists, whereas only 38 % pessimists, can fully appreciate the planning.

If a majority of people make some sort of plans for the future, which things do they consider important in order to accomplish success in the future? The most frequently mentioned preconditions of future success include the ability of learn new things, the ability to adjust to local conditions, the ability to cooperate with the others, the ability to make oneself understood in a foreign language, and the ability to work hard. Generally speaking, these abilities could be summarized under the terms of flexibility and productivity, which are skills that can easily accommodate a broadly accepted vision of modernization, as well as aspirations of a majority of population to build a high-performance turbo society. These skills are also frequently discussed and emphasized by experts and employers. The shared vision of a modern information society is congruent with another group of skills: inventiveness, creativity and talent, which 88 % respondents regard as prerequisites for future success. Less important –

even though by far not unimportant – are supposed to be social contacts (85 %), money and property (83 %) and formal qualifications (77 %). The endeavour to surpass the others appeared to be even less important (70 %).

However, the ideas of what should be done are one thing and their materialization is another thing. So, what people actually do in order to improve their future? Most of them take care of their health. This opinion appeared in 84 % answers. It is followed by economizing and saving (76 %), hard work (71 %) and care of relatives (69 %). Another group of distinctive activities – *work on oneself* – follows at a certain distance. Only 56 % respondents educate themselves and only a little higher number of them declares to read a lot.

Generally speaking, the Czechs tend to save their money rather than to invest into themselves (e.g. education). It is quite an astonishing strategy especially at present when the return on investment into education proves many times higher than saving as interest rates can hardly make up for inflation. The acquired data not only reveal our steadily poor willingness to educate ourselves but also our poor ability to manage our financial resources and invest them well. However, the fact that a majority of respondents do not associate future improvements in their private lives with their influencing of a broader social context is even more striking. Only one third of the questioned citizens try to improve public affairs in their domicile and a mere quarter of them try to establish contacts with important people. These data also reveal that a majority of the Czechs have simply resigned from influencing public affairs.

On the whole, the dominant individual life strategy can be thus characterized as a private and performance-oriented one (while paying attention to their health care) but it lacks willingness to take risks and invest into the improvement of our own qualities.

## **1.2 What We Know about the Future**

We live at the beginning of the *fourth information revolution* (the first one – the invention of the speech 500.000 years ago, the second one – the invention of the script 5.000 years ago, the third one – the invention of typography – 500 years ago, the fourth one – the invention of the computer 50 years ago). The swirling of the vortex keeps accelerating. The following key factors of this movement are being examined:

**Population growth:** The exponential increase in the number of people calls for a no less exponential increase in the production of food, exploitation of resources, construction of dwellings, communications etc. Statistics bring convincing information on the aging of the world population: according to the UN sources, the average age of the world population has increased from 24 years in 1950 to 27 years in 2000. Demographers expect that in 2050 the global age average will be 36 years, and even 49 years in Europe. It can be expected that the aging population will lead to a greater loading of social programs, especially to the increasing expenditure on pensions and health care. Pressure on public budgets in Europe will be really striking, perhaps even destabilizing, especially after 2010, when numerically strong generations

are going to retire, and when expenditures will consequently start rising. The regular retirement age will have to be considerably postponed and people will have to work, their health permitting, until they are seventy (or even more) years old. With regard to the fact that unlike today the future generations will not perform manual labour so much, this solution is quite conceivable.

However, this situation will bring about several serious consequences for labour market. Firstly, the flow of young labour forces will abate and, secondly, the current idea of work as an exclusively full-time job will weaken (especially older workers will be typically employed on part-time, secondary and temporary work contracts), and, thirdly, the importance of lifelong learning will be on rise. Fifty years is simply a too long period of time for a person to work in one profession (let alone in one institution) throughout his or her entire life.

The influence of the uneven demographic growth in the world will result in the increasing capacity, intensity and importance of migration. Demographic pressures in overpopulated developing countries will be multiplied by attractive factors of population stagnation in more advanced countries. From the economic point of view, the migration from the former countries to the latter ones represents a stabilizing element strengthening prosperity. Although cultural issues and the redistribution of profit will probably make the transition to a new demographic balance more distressful than the purely economic considerations may seem to indicate.

**Science and technology:** The long-term growth is impossible without a technological development. Moreover, new inventions will offer new things, so far unthinkable. New technologies therefore provide a key to the productivity growth, but their development is less important than their efficient application. Considering the time lapse between an invention and its application, our ability to apply the already existing technologies will become a big issue in the oncoming 15-20 years. This ability is further conditioned by social institutions and cultural attitudes that are closely linked to the technologies. We are dealing here with four waves of technological inventions that are to appear in the given period: computers, telecommunications, biotechnology and nanotechnology.

Innovations in telecommunications and information science have brought about a revolution in the information technology. Even though this revolution is still in its infancy and the boom of digital technologies and their application are still ahead, this revolution has an enormous power. Its momentum is based on three main reasons.

Firstly, information technologies help to release the potential of other technologies and thus prompt sub-revolutions in other fields. Secondly, information technologies enable information to spread all over the planet faster, on a larger scope, and less expensively. And, thirdly, in the spheres where the previous technological revolutions transformed the matter and energy, the information technology primarily operates with time and distance.

In the following 20 years we shall witness an explosion of medical technologies based on genetic research, which will help us recognize and cure illnesses caused by genetic defects

before they develop, perhaps even in the womb. During the next twenty years, the health care system therefore might transform from the traditional *diagnosis and therapy* type to the *prediction and prevention* one. The biotechnological revolution will have a significant impact on another economic sector – agriculture. The more profound understanding of genetics will lead to a much more efficient ways of cultivation of plants. At the same time, however, we must be very careful and not let the genetic engineering get out of control. In the oncoming 20 years, the development of genetically modified biological weapons might become a much more pervasive and less manageable problem than the technology of producing nuclear weapons.

Computers will be everywhere. We shall find ourselves in constant contact with miniature, wireless, portable, high-performance and high-personalized computers providing access to the global network. Such computers may appear on the market in the form of watches or jewels and may be capable of the same performance as personal computers and mobile telephones. Later on, we will even have computers sewn in our clothes, or perhaps even implanted under our skin. Around 2010, the Intel company will develop a chip containing one milliard of transistors – one hundred times more comprehensive than the most advanced integrated circuit produced at the close of the 1990's. Around 2015, a reliable simultaneous foreign language translator will be developed, which will have immediate consequences for the multilingual world.

The development of microprocessors is bound to run against a technical barrier: that is why scientists and engineers are trying to develop suitable methods of constructing objects one atom after another. Microscopic devices, measuring in atoms rather than in millimetres, will bring about revolutions in several industries and may thus offer a broad range of application – from house heating to the treatment of cancer.

**Environment:** If the world does not renounce its current attitudes advocating the primacy of markets, the ever-growing construction of communications, electric lines, airports and other infrastructures, it will upset the reproduction cycle of many species of feral animals and exterminate a number of biological species, especially in coastal areas that are most densely populated. Nowadays forests are ravaged at the worrying speed of 150.000 km<sup>2</sup> per year and 10 % of arable land, originally used for the cultivation of corn, has ceased being used due to the soil erosion.

Environmental problems, such as deforestation, soil erosion, water and air pollution, losses in fishery, and toxic waste, will become a pressing problem everywhere. A great deal of pollution will be caused by the use of fossil fuel in the energy production.

**Economic development:** In this decade the global economic profit will increase by 3 % per year (in Asia the speed will be twice as high) and the commerce will grow by 6 % per year. Two thirds of the increase in the global GDP will originate in the OECD non-member countries (poor, developing and transforming countries), which entails an enormous shift of business opportunities in the direction of the South and the East. The economic power will then keep moving from the United States to Asia, primarily China and India.

In addition to the demographic and environmental stresses we must also take into account the third type of stresses: competition in competitiveness. In order to be able to participate in this competition, both rich and poor countries will require these three abilities: agility, networking and learning.

The application of these abilities will be hampered by persisting protectionism. Trade barriers, mostly maintained by rich countries in the form of subsidies and taxes, deprive the world economy of up to 650 milliard dollars per year. The largest damage comes from subsidies on export of agricultural products and from taxes on agricultural and textile production, as it is precisely poor countries that are most dependent on export of these goods.

Nevertheless, the globalization does not necessarily have to be a game with negative or zero profits. It is rather an important source of economic growth because every single economy can specialize in those fields at which it is good, and can also join practices of the most productive economies. Many countries, however, still lack the fundamental conditions necessary for joining global markets and, from both a relative and total points of view, their conditions keep deteriorating.

**Values and attitudes:** The keynote motto of value attitudes in the oncoming era will be: *Open, right. Closed, wrong.* This motto can be applied to anything: to technological standards, business strategies, and life philosophies. This is a triumphant concept for individuals, nations, and the global community in the future years. If the world follows an enclosed path, it will find itself in a vicious circle: nations will turn inwards, falling apart into isolated blocks. That will empower traditionalists and will produce rigid ways of thinking. That will stop the economy and bring about increasing poverty. That will result in conflicts and growing intolerance making for an even more closed society and an even more fragmentary world. If, on the other hand, the world embraces an open model, a completely different beautiful circle will come into being: open societies will turn outwards, striving to become integrated in the world. This openness to changes and the exposure to new ideas will yield innovation and progress. That will bring about an increasing surplus and decreasing poverty. That will lead to growing tolerance and appreciation of diversity that will in turn support a more open society and a highly integrated world.

**Management:** The most urgent problems of the oncoming decade are transnational in nature and that is why their solutions should be sought on the transnational level. Factors obstructing the solution-seeking process appear to be the same all over the world and are largely independent of individual nations and cultures. The most pressing issues might be listed as follows:

Institutional: the fact that no one is responsible for measure-taking, lack of inevitable coordination between ministries and organizations in charge, institutional indifference;

Financial: lack of financial means and the fact that that people who are supposed to provide financial means do not want to do so;

Lack of interest in the future: short-term problems are paid more attention to than those that influence our distant future;

Incompetent planning: lack of a long-term perspective;

Personal: lack of decision-making abilities, responsible people do not understand complex problems they are put in charge of;

Strategic: lack of distinct strategies and objectives, insufficient coordination of working methods of the involved people;

Complexity: insufficient understanding of a scope of problems, lacking models demonstrating complex interconnectedness of events and methods, insufficient understanding of consequences induced by adopted measures, stereotypical reasoning;

Political: measures are in disagreement with national interests or are proposed by a political opponent, insufficient involvement of regions, corporations and certain groups;

Information: lack of precise, reliable and sufficient data and information, insufficient information on the amount of risk, contradictory information, lack of coordinated search for information.

The aforementioned *challenges for the future* signal that a disconnected development is more likely than a continuous one. If the future development is continuous, there is a relative agreement among prognostics on the likelihood of the below listed trends:

- Population in advanced countries will stop increasing and will start aging. Population in the developing world will keep rapidly growing.
- The proportion of population with secondary and university education will also noticeably increase.
- On the whole, the world will keep getting rich, the minimum 3% increase can be expected, however, regional differences will outlast.
- The world will be more and more interconnected both in terms of economy and culture.
- There will be an enormous explosion of information, its volume and accessibility; the proportion of economic products based on information and knowledge will increase in size.
- Technological innovations will continue appearing at the same pace or even faster.
- Political power will become more diversified.
- Human nature will not undergo any significant changes.

Other trends such as, for instance, the emergence of new threats to society, will be different in nature in the sense that we shall be mainly dealing with consequences of events caused by humankind, occurring in particular moments of time and therefore very unreliable. We therefore have to take into account certain possible developmental discontinuities – events that are not very likely to happen but that, at the same time, could have far-reaching consequences for the global development, i.e. a sort of *shocks* that are usually referred to as *wild cards*. The following summary lists some of the wild cards that are frequently mentioned in international literature on prognostics in relation to our near future:

- Massive migration from the developing world to advanced countries.
- The inability of Europe and Japan to cope with the ageing of their populations.
- An epidemic of a new fatal disease.
- An enormous environmental catastrophe.
- Thawing icebergs and the markedly rising levels of the oceans.
- Serious cuts in the world energy supplies.
- Grave disputes over water as a shortage source.
- A scientific invention of a great economic import.
- A big collapse of financial markets.
- Collapse in the Near East.
- The formation of an alliance of China, India and Russia.
- The formation of an international terrorist alliance.
- Collapse of international relations between Europe and the United States.
- Collapse of the UN.
- The use of weapons of mass destruction.

Even though there is no reason to bet on any of the above listed wild cards, it is still quite likely that one or more of them will come true in the oncoming twenty years.





## 2 STRATEGIC MOVES OF DEVELOPMENT

### 2.0 Introduction to the Strategic Moves

The Czech Republic is facing many problems that call for systematic solutions: in its previous study, the CESES identified 77 priority problems of the Czech society (*Průvodce*, 2002, Chapter III, pp. 403–504) and 30 strategic concepts of their solutions (*Průvodce*, 2002, Chapter IV, pp. 505–652). Nonetheless, their number and field specifics make the selection of actual priorities more complicated.

That is why it is necessary to look for and **formulate a more general and comprehensive strategy**, referred to as the *strategic moves* in the *Travelling*.

From a methodological viewpoint, the strategic move is defined as follows: “*a potential structured process of social innovations and their consequences, significantly exceeding common operations of the state and society. Its implementation presupposes concentration and coordinated application of considerable resources. In distinction to the strategic concepts formulated in the Guide to the Landscape of Priorities, the strategic move is basically defined on a higher level of universality.*”

The requirements for the strategic moves are specified as follows:

- It contains a non-trivial compositional element or an original idea.
- It can be justified by apparent or long-term, direct and/or mediated positive impact on the quality and sustainability of life in the Czech Republic.
- The proportion between its potential contribution to the improvement of the quality and sustainability of life, on one hand, and anticipated resources for its implementation, on the other hand, must justify its selection among the other innovations of higher order on offer.
- It represents such a course of transformations in institutions, life conditions, attitudes and behaviour of population, which exceed the limits of authority of individual departments and terms of office of individual governments.
- In the course of its implementation it will induce positive changes in other spheres of social life (multiplying effect).
- The original initiator of its conception can be politicians, or the expert or civic public.
- The basic time horizon of the strategic moves is the year of 2020. However, consequences of the strategic move implementation can outlast until 2040.

The question remains, what is and what is not a strategic move in the Czech society? First of all, it is apparent that the set of potential strategic moves is still open and that their selection and implementation have a **participatory character**. Ideally, the selection and definition of strategic moves should be conditioned by a broad public discussion.

The submitted formulation of strategic moves is far from being ideal: due to the lack of time and limited capacity, discussions have take place solely among the CESES staff and their close

collaborators. Their discussions, taking up over approximately two months, have produced the following identifications and justifications of strategic moves:

1. Cultivation of knowledge into a key factor of production.
2. System of comprehensive security management in the Czech Republic.
3. Activation of territorial communities.
4. Ways of development of social solidarity and national and civic identity.

After the selection of strategic moves, the plan of their elaboration has been determined as follows:

- Elementary definition of a strategic move (definition and character of a strategic move, its relation to the quality and sustainability of life and the economic growth).
- Justification of a strategic move in a broader (global) context (reasons for the indispensable implementation of this move).
- Theoretical points of departure and definition of main terms (definition of main terms and their application in a broader theoretical framework).
- Analysis of the current situation in a given field in the Czech Republic (weak and strong points of the Czech Republic in a given field in a well-arranged and concise form).
- Implementation of a strategic move (proposal for measures divided into individual *streams* of measures). In this respect we are also dealing with opportunities to modernize democracy in the Czech Republic – in terms of a general presupposition of the implementation of strategic moves.

Despite all the above listed processional limitations, the ultimate selection of strategic moves is not arbitrary. It is grounded in the long-term work and knowledge acquired by the CESES in the course of the previous phases of its research work (the conceptual model of the development of the Czech society and its modernization in the global context, developmental potentials, formative regulators, priority problems, strategic concepts) and respects both the popular mood and expert opinions. However, it would be insincere not to admit that we have also come up against obstacles: the limited capacity of our team and the fact that we were unable to work out some of the generally accepted topics into strategic moves. In other words, we are convinced that the necessity of selected strategic moves is well grounded and indisputable, however, we are aware that the submitted selection **is not definitive**. Our further discussions are now to focus on the exact *aims* of the strategic moves and on proposals for their implementation.

Mutual relations, interdependence and complementarities of the individual strategic moves are still followed by question marks. Although our initial intention was to offer various possible and alternative *milestones* of the Czech future, it is now obvious that the strategic moves are mutually conditioned. The moves are largely complementary in nature, they only vary in the manner in which they carry out a *cut* in the future and which dimension they pursue. Their directions, however, remain similar. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude a potential conflict – if

due to the intense implementation of one strategic move there are no resources (not only financial, but also human and organizational resources) left for the implementation of the other moves. Demands, complexity and mutual interconnectedness of strategic moves call for concentrated efforts of a large group of people. Even the CESES discussions brought up many more aspects and connections worth elaborating. The elaboration of the strategic moves is therefore, similar to their implementation, an open and endless process and the following texts should be therefore viewed in this light.

## 2.1 Cultivation of Knowledge into a Key Factor of Production

Today the main generator of competitiveness is the production of commodities and services with a high added value and containing a high percent of know how. **However, the economic system of the Czech Republic and, as a matter of fact, the entire society rely on low-qualification work and short-sighted exploitation of exhaustible natural resources.**

The strategic aim we need to achieve here is frequently referred to as the *knowledge-driven economy* or *knowledge society*. The human society, however, had relied on knowledge from its earliest stages. Moreover, these terms seem to be rather static. They evoke the idea that there are some ideal and final target conditions to be accomplished, for instance, by building the *knowledge society* once and for ever.

*Cultivation of knowledge into a key factor of production*, on the contrary, represents a dynamic concept. It is based on a gradual and constant cultivation of five key knowledge processes (knowledge production, learning, knowledge dissemination, knowledge application and knowledge management) and legislative, economic, social and cultural framework in which these processes take place.

The central criterion for the cultivation of knowledge into a productive factor is the simultaneous increase in economic competitiveness and in the quality of life, its sustainability and social cohesion. Albeit the principal objective is the economic growth, or **economic competitiveness** based on knowledge, the strategic move also works – and must work – in agreement with permanently sustainable development (as the growth shifts into the sphere of immaterial consumption and services) and enables to **enhance the quality of life** (greater opportunities for self-realization and fulfilment of one's natural potential).

Which type of knowledge, however, is the most important one from the perspective of competitiveness and quality of life? Which type do we lack most? These questions become even more intricate as individual types of knowledge transform into different types in cognitive processes and, as a consequence, in practice can be hardly distinguished one from another (for instance, tacit knowledge from explicit knowledge). But still we can try to formulate some general conclusions:

***Cultivation of knowledge cannot be restricted to a single type of knowledge.*** This requires “a *fight* on several battlefronts”. What purpose do, for instance, information super-highways serve if there are no people who could make use of the information they provide?

And vice versa: What purpose does the expansion of intelligence and creativity serve if young researchers cannot access modern scientific findings? Why do we have qualified people in organization that do not allow them to apply their qualifications, for instance, by imposing restrictive norms and methods? And vice versa: Why do we have excellent methods if there are no people who could apply them or at least understand them?

As far as individual types of knowledge are concerned, **the disciplines relying on knowledge are becoming equally important while the importance of transdisciplinary approaches is growing.** The increased interest in social and humanistic studies, as well as in emotional intelligence, proves that the quality of life and competitiveness cannot be exclusively associated with the advance in natural and technical sciences. Analogically we can observe that innovations originate not only in technological changes but significantly also in organizational and managerial changes. On the other hand, we must forewarn against the aversion to scientific cognition and the lack of interest in natural and technical sciences as these are – and will always be – the main source of competitiveness. A transdisciplinary position and a transdisciplinary way of problem solving, unrestricted by limits of traditional disciplines, thus represent a current trend.


**The key to prosperity lies in innovation, i.e. in new, applied and *action* knowledge.** The advanced states do not find the main source of competitiveness in research and development as such, but in innovative systems, i.e. in the production of knowledge in conjunction with its application, especially in the commercial sphere.

**Tacit, uncodified knowledge gains importance, primarily in its highest forms** (understanding, wisdom). Firms carefully consider their investment with respect to available labour force and its qualifications. The times of Taylorism are long gone and the training of new employees in hi-tech branches is very time-consuming. Educated people and the untransferable, *tacit* knowledge they embody are becoming the rudiments of competitiveness of states and enterprises. As a consequence, brain-drain processes are intensifying.

**Minor innovations appearing in great quantity determine competitiveness and the quality of life to a larger extent than highly theoretical knowledge.** If the level of a given society used to be measured by the degree to which its elite was able to produce and apply the most complex knowledge (e.g. the production of a nuclear bomb), today it is measured by permanent innovations that may be minor but that have to appear in greater quantity. The overwhelming majority of people producing knowledge are called “*artisans in the good sense of the word – people who perform their professions with initiative and creativity.*” That is to say that the production of new knowledge can no longer be restricted to men of genius and outstanding individuals. On the contrary, it is necessary that not only professional scientists and researchers, but also managers, teachers, directors of schools and public institutions etc. should be innovative.

Traditional models of the cultivation of knowledge are becoming less effective in their role of productive factors. Until recently, it was assumed that the technological development was

being accomplished in a sort of a linear chain, beginning with the basic research, proceeding directly to the applied research (composed of scientific knowledge in technological applications) and, ultimately, to the commercial application. Science and education used to be regarded as a propelling force and there was an optimistic assumption that produced knowledge would find its own application. The only thing that governments needed was a good science policy. The given model can be illustrated by the following scheme:



It has turned out, however, that more knowledge does not necessarily have to produce more innovations. That is why governments began developing innovative policies based on research and development policies but at the same time, paying considerable attention to the transfer and application of knowledge. More attention has also been paid to private enterprises and to the introduction of innovations to companies. The idea of the linear process of knowledge application has thus been gradually abandoned and substituted by a model of networks and channels connecting many actors and characterized by circulation, transfer and diffusion of ideas, information and knowledge of various sorts. This system has then been introduced to appropriate political, social and cultural frameworks.

The contemporary framework defining the field of productive aspects of knowledge is *knowledge-driven economy*. According to The World Bank Institute there are four elementary conditions of full participation in the knowledge-driven economy:

- Legal and economic environment enabling a free circulation of knowledge, investment in ICT and support of enterprise;
- Educated population able to produce, share and apply knowledge;
- A dynamic information infrastructure (from the radio to the Internet) enabling efficient communication, and processing and spreading of information;
- A network of research centres, universities, think tanks, private enterprises and non-profit organizations ready to be connected to the growing volume of global knowledge, to adapt it to local conditions and to produce new knowledge.

In addition, there are also other conditions that are vital for the production of new ideas, their diffusion and practical application. These are namely:

**Independence and originality of thinking.** An original creation cannot come into existence without an original idea: *“If the habit of not thinking is practised for too long, it can be hardly done away with later on.”*

**Openness to diversity.** Excessive homogeneity represents a barrier to innovations and unables the adaptation to an environment. Innovative companies therefore frequently set up

temporary work teams, change project teams and hire experts from outside in order to enhance their exposure to new ideas and to a variety of perspectives.

**Openness to the new.** The endeavour to introduce innovations must always struggle with a certain degree of natural conservatism of people and institutions (which is, after all, practical to a certain extent). Even private companies find it difficult to part with their tradition, especially if it is a successful and long-lasting tradition. However, it is necessary to finish even with that what had proved very successful in the past.

**Orientation to the future**, for several reasons. Firstly, the investment in knowledge shows high and long-term return rates. It is necessary to resist the temptation of immediate satisfaction or success. Investment in knowledge, research and development can prove worthwhile in ten years or later – long after contemporary politicians and representatives of high management in private enterprises have left their offices. Secondly, contrary to the traditional notion that creative deeds must originate in strokes of genius, the production of new useful knowledge requires perseverance and long-term diligence in the first place.

**Endeavour to get ahead of the others and the inner motivation to succeed.** The society sometimes hypocritically regards the desire for knowledge as the only legitimate reason for the investment in education or the production of knowledge. Healthy knowledge processes also necessitate other incentives that are, however, sometimes being criticized: the effort of accomplish something, to improve oneself, to be more successful (and consequently also richer) and to break through, are frequently labelled with slightly derogatory attributes, such as *ambitious*, *overly pushy* etc. This phenomenon is also closely related to the **attitudes to entrepreneurship and success**. In the post-communist countries the mistrust of success used to be instigated by unjustifiable financial profits.

**Positive attitude to science, research and technologies.** All the advanced countries have undergone, or are still partly undergoing, a period characterized by a lack of interest in science, especially in technical disciplines, on the side of young generations. Research work does not rank among the top prestigious professions and that is why young people whose exceptional talents might be used in research and development often opt for better-paid positions in other professions that, however, from the perspective of the cultivation of knowledge, are not that significant. On the whole, the Europeans (or EU citizens) take positive attitudes to science and support it, not only if it contributes to the development of new technologies but also if it "*only contributes to the advancement of knowledge.*"

**Social capital.** Trust, the basic component of the social capital, is the oil of the economic system: it reduces frictions – transactional expenses. The lack of trust increases costs as it leads to the increase of administration and wastage of energy spent on the issue of *how to control*. Consequently, the will to think about *how to create and develop* becomes deficient. The situation in the Czech Republic is far away from the above listed requirements. This fact is reflected in the competitiveness indicators. According to the *Global Report on Competitiveness for 2001–2002* (2001), in 2001 the Czech Republic held 37<sup>th</sup> place out of

75 countries in the GCI growth index (compare with 32<sup>nd</sup> place in 2000). In the present GCI index the Czech Republic takes 35<sup>th</sup> place (34<sup>th</sup> place in 2000). Since 1998, in fact 1999, the development in the Czech Republic moved from 35<sup>th</sup> to 37<sup>th</sup> place in the growth index and from 41<sup>st</sup> to 35<sup>th</sup> place in the present index.

What are the roots of this rather unflattering situation? Among the individual sectors in the growth index, the Czech Republic is quite advanced in the technological index (20<sup>th</sup> place), holds a worse position in the index of macroeconomic environment (49<sup>th</sup> place), and fails in the index of public institutions (53<sup>rd</sup> place). As for the structure of the present index, the Czech Republic holds 41<sup>st</sup> place in the index of business operations and strategies and 33<sup>rd</sup> place in the quality of national business environment.

What are the main barriers to the cultivation of knowledge in the Czech Republic? They are the following:

- Economic and legal environment (low enforceability of law, insufficient protection of intellectual property, insufficient support to small and medium-size enterprises (SME), slow restructuralization of national economy);
- Education (the Czech educational system displays attributes typical of the industrial era – mass and short-term training of cheap labour force, the Czech population may be educated but this type of education does not comply with requirements of our times, the educational system contributes to the separation of the *academic perspective* from the *practical demands of the world*);
- Innovation infrastructure (the condition of libraries);
- Innovation system (financial support of research, efforts to support the undirected basic research at the expense of the applied and oriented research, a low number of results of the applied research – inventions, low pressure on the returns of investment, the transfer of technology and the application of knowledge).

These and similar barriers can be only eliminated by embracing such a comprehensive strategy of the cultivation of knowledge that is structured by key knowledge processes and permeates all areas. In this respect the **main streams** of the cultivation of knowledge can be defined as the following:

1. **Lifelong learning.** The objective of this stream is to create such a society in which people have opportunities to learn, want to learn and are able to learn throughout their lives. This requires: **to change the attitude to educational institutions** (so that they become propelling forces of economic growth), **to radically increase investment on learning** (to increase the number of public, and especially private expenses on education in order to equal the standards in advanced countries), **to increase the offer of relevant educational opportunities** (to offer lower degrees of tertiary education, three cycles of educational programs at universities, more links between various types of tertiary institutions), **to ensure equal educational opportunities for all children and students, to encourage interest in learning and motivation to**

further education, to teach students how to learn, to carry out systematic evaluations of results on national and regional levels, to transform the training of pedagogical staff both prior to and during their professional careers.

2. **Production of knowledge.** A successful cultivation of knowledge is characterized by a high level of diversified means used for the production of new knowledge, by the *networking* of various actors producing knowledge and by a strong emphasis on the usefulness of acquired knowledge. This requires: **to change attitudes to the production of knowledge** (to eliminate the isolation of the world of science from the social environment), **to emphasize the quality and results, to find an equilibrium between the representation of various actors and various types of knowledge, to support audacious and challenging projects, to interconnect actors producing knowledge and to ensure flexible formations of research teams.**
3. **Application of knowledge.** The innovation process is concluded by the implementation, application and commercial valuation of knowledge. It is precisely in this sphere where we are lagging behind the advanced countries that themselves fall behind the United States. First of all, it is essential **to support the formation and development of innovative SMEs by means of innovation investment** (venture capital), **to support the acceptance of results achieved by private enterprises at academic institutes and universities** (joint research-development institutes), **to support *inner innovation channels*, i.e. to enhance research performed by companies and to motivate their staff to apply research outcomes in the commercial sphere.**
4. **Diffusion of knowledge.** Knowledge and information only bring minimal effect unless they are diffused outside the circle of their origin. That is why it is vital to cultivate channels by which knowledge – in all its forms – can spread in a fast, reliable and safe way, and to support the willingness and the ability of subjects of knowledge to interact and communicate among themselves, and thus share and exchange knowledge. In the first place, we should therefore try to achieve **further development of information infrastructure** (to reduce the cost of the Internet access, to promote information literacy and electronic shopping, to improve libraries), **improvement of communication among various actors** (diffusion of silent knowledge), **higher integration into international structures, broader application of knowledge coming from abroad,**
5. **Knowledge management.** Knowledge management represents a central knowledge process establishing rules and conditions for the other knowledge processes. Instead of direct support and control, a new and much more difficult task arises: to create such an environment in which the most rational option is to learn, to invest into one's abilities, to be creative and try to make use of available knowledge for the creation of both one's own and social prosperity. At this point it is first of all necessary **to change**



**the way of thinking of all segments of our society** – from politicians, scientists and teachers to the general public. It is also inevitable to establish the following conditions: **to guarantee a fair competitive environment**, to cultivate **macroeconomic conditions convenient to knowledge**, to consolidate the **enforceability of law** (namely in the sphere of the protection of intellectual property).

In order to launch the given strategic move into practice, **the first step must initiate efforts to overcome the traditional, stereotypical and, above all, simplified model of the cultivation of knowledge in relation to production.** Secondly, it is necessary to search for those actors who are really interested in the implementation of this strategic move: **to build and interconnect the *islands of positive deviation*.** Only at the point when there is quite a strong social base ready for comprehensive treatment of the cultivation of knowledge and when there is enough progressive actors is it possible to launch the actual **implementation of most of the aforementioned measures.**

## **2.2 System of Comprehensive Security Management in the Czech Republic**

The productive idea of this strategic move is a conceptional and organizational proposal for a comprehensive solution of actual and potential exterior threats to security and of interior crisis situations of various nature, type and intensity. In the course of its theoretical and practical preparation and implementation, this proposal might become, as a new approach to the concept of security management and thanks to its comprehensiveness, a significant social innovation resulting in a synergic effect: **in an active civic and professional concept of security in the Czech Republic**, in the consolidated external and internal security of the country, in budget savings on the entire system and its individual sectors, and in higher participation of citizens – either directly or mediated by organizations of defence community – in the development, preparations and implementation of security policy in compliance with the immediate civic management and control of this system.

The system of comprehensive security management will contribute to a more efficient insurance of the internal security of the Czech Republic. This factor represents a fundamental prerequisite for the quality and sustainability of life, which is immediately and persistently reflected in all the principal social potentials of the society and consolidates the position of the Czech Republic in Europe, in the world and in international organizations and institutions of which it is a member.

The objective of this strategic move entitled the System of Comprehensive Security Management of the Czech Republic is **to optimise the performance of the security system in the Czech Republic as a system of bodies of legislative, executive and judicatory power, armed forces, armed security, rescue, emergency and other forces and services, legal entities and individual persons, and their interconnection** during preparations and implementation of activities aimed at the coordinated progress in ensuring

security in the Czech Republic in the course of various types of external threats to security and in internal crisis situations.

The violation of security of the Czech Republic may be related to the emergence of various types of crisis situations that can be divided into four basic groups related to:

- External invasion to the Czech Republic, fulfilment of international commitments or treaties of alliance of the Czech Republic abroad or the involvement of the Czech armed forces in international peace operations in the event of violation of international security, in which case the Ministry of Defence acts as a coordinative body and the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR) as the main executive body;
- Violence of the internal security of the state or of the public order, in which case the Ministry of Interior acts as a coordinative body and the Police of the Czech Republic (PCR) and other armed security forces as main executive bodies;
- Menace to lives, health, property or environment during natural disasters, catastrophes and various forms of violence, in which case the Ministry of Interior again acts as a coordinative body whereas individual departments of the Integrated Rescue System, such as the Fire Brigade (FB) and other rescue teams, and emergency, rescue and other teams and brigades, act as executive forces;
- Threats to the operativeness of the national economic system, in which case the **coordinative body has not been determined yet.**

**Security policy is therefore composed of five basic elements or components:**

1. foreign policy within the scope of national security,
2. defence and military policy of the state,
3. policy of the internal security and public order,
4. policy securing national economic security,
5. defence of population, its property and environment against consequences of natural disasters and catastrophes.

Security policy represents an aggregate of all the above listed components, however, it is not a mere arithmetical sum. It rather shows its own comprehensive authentic and system-like qualities. State security policy disposes of its own operational background, especially in terms of economy and finances, system, logistics and legislation.

Of course, the above-described concept of security policy must react to current forms of threats to security, which reflect the conflicting nature of the increasingly globalized world and deteriorating environmental conditions. New types of threats to security are characterized by their dynamic origins, influence, diffusion and interconnection. This factor brings an immediate impact upon the external and internal security of states and regions. The omnipresent and destructive character of new threats to security brings about universal consequences. Our reaction to these threats must be therefore universal as well. The state, appropriate authorities and citizens, all participating in the protection of national security, as proved by our recent

experience (meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, floods, participation in international peacekeeping missions etc.), are not yet well prepared for this new situation.

The new character of modern wars and armed conflicts also signals the need not to solve reconstructions, transformations and reforms and other forms of rationalization exclusively within the framework of individual subsystems (armed forces, armed security forces, intelligence services, rescue teams, emergency teams and other elements of the integrated rescue system, private security services, public administration and municipal authorities, participation and alertness of citizens), but rather as a systematic comprehensive security management of the country.

As for the implementation of this strategic move, it is necessary to proceed from the existing situation, to keep the tried elements of the system of comprehensive security management and to include new ones. The reason is that the current interconnection and overlap of crisis situations call for a similar overlap of traditional qualifications needed to solve individual situations. However, the traditional model of security, in which the Ministry of Defence is in charge of the external security and the Ministry of Interior in charge of the internal security, including the defence of population, ceases to be effective. The formerly impenetrable border between the authorities of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior is nowadays becoming more flexible. These ministries have launched close cooperation with each other, both in terms of preparations and handling of crisis situations, regardless of the traditional division into external and internal types of threats. The most striking difference is apparent in the ACR mission that is now supposed to perform, especially when managing so-called non-military crisis situations, a broader range of activities than formerly required. In view of that there is a growing number of voices calling for a certain integration of the entire security system and its administrative structures.

The first practical example of the need to overcome barriers of departmental authorities is the foundation of the Integrated Rescue System (IRS). **Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out that – neither at that time nor today – could the IRS be regarded as an integration of administrative structures or even as an integrated security system as such.**

However, the setting up of security councils and crisis staffs in regions and municipalities can be taken as an example of the integration of administrative structures. These bodies are composed of representatives of administrative authorities of respective territories and representatives of the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR), Police of the Czech Republic (PCR), Fire Brigade (FB) and other security system components in respective territories. In a certain way, this system contains elements of collective management enabling mutual coordination of activities performed by a respective administrative authority, ACR, PCR, FB and others, within the framework of one given territorial and administrative unit. Thus the leading role of the center is not undermined as it maintains its right to manoeuvre individual forces and means across individual territorial and administrative units.

National administrative structures have always been integrated by the Government that represents a collective body disposing of the authority required for the management of national security. Although it is a collective decision-making body, the existing findings have partly dispelled emerging doubts about the Government's sufficient capacity of action to adopt necessary decisions in crisis situations, as well as doubts about the adequacy of the concentration of the Government's executive authorities into the hands of one single person.

The National Security Council (NSC) operates as the Government's advisory body for security matters. It is composed of ministers of key departments and is headed by Prime Minister. The NSC may have no statutory executive power, however, this defect has been already partially remedied by the Government itself as it has authorized the NSC to assign tasks to all the members of the Government in matters of security management. Further extension of the NSC authorities is now being considered with respect to the preparations of a legislative reform of armed forces, which is currently underway.

The Central Crisis Staff (CCS) operates as the Government's advisory body for solving crisis situations. It is composed of permanent secretaries or chairmen of key central administrative authorities, Head of the ACR General Staff, Head of the Police Forces, FB General Director and representatives of other executive bodies of the security system of the Czech Republic. Certain complications arise from the double chairmanship of this body: in the event of crisis situations related to an external attack on the Czech Republic or to the country's fulfilment of international commitments and treaties of alliance abroad, the body is headed by Minister of Defence, and in the other, non-military emergency events it is presided by Minister of Interior.

However, all the practical experience gained through the process of the integration of administrative structures proves to be insufficient face-to-face new threats. That is why a strategic decision should be adopted, enabling to launch the strategic implementation of the system of comprehensive security management in the Czech Republic. The procedure should be as follows:

1. To establish a temporary but competent organizational body that would complete the already initiated first measure – the process of strategic planning – by introducing the system of comprehensive security management. The strategic planning should include:
  - a. research and analysis of the appropriate internal and external conditions of the existing and future system and its sources,
  - b. a strategic plan of the system of comprehensive security management of the Czech Republic.
2. The second crucial measure of this strategic move should be the implementation of the construction and preparation of the system of comprehensive security management of the Czech Republic.

The implementation and construction of the system of comprehensive security management of the Czech Republic would have to be discussed in central administrative bodies that are authorized to deal with these issues while the Office of the Government of the Czech Republic

(Defence and Security Department) would operate as a coordinator of negotiations. The aforementioned bodies would be also responsible for specific proposals for law amendments necessitated by the introduction of comprehensive security management of the Czech Republic. In an ideal case, the entire process would be administered by a **Government representative for the implementation of the system of comprehensive security management of the Czech Republic.**

The decision to appoint a government representative, disposing of a relatively small team of collaborators – experts, is necessitated by the fact that the set goal can be accomplished only with such a representative. If this position was to be taken up by one of the existing units of the security system (e.g. the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Defence), several risks would arise: simultaneous fulfilment of conceptual and operative tasks, preference of one's own institution in the proposed model etc. – all of these would rather impede and deform the procedure of establishing the comprehensive security management. Also the positive experience of the Minister of Defence and his team from appointing the government's representative for the preparation of the reform of armed forces (The Centre for the Reform of Armed Forces) is in favour of this proposal.

The upcoming reform of the armed forces, coordination of intelligence service, rationalization of the armed security forces and of the integrated rescue system, the position of private security services, public administration and public authorities etc. would be subsequently administered by the system of comprehensive management including respective legislative amendments that would, at the same time, integrate and determine positions of members of the individual units.

The solution of this issue should be retrospectively reflected by a reform of armed forces and lead to the revision and perhaps new drafts of doctrinal documents (Security Strategy, Military Strategy etc.). With regard to the present and future commitments and treaties of alliance, it will be necessary to put the creation and implementation of the system of comprehensive security management of the Czech Republic in compliance with the existing and upcoming NATO and EU security concepts (European Security and Defence Policy).

### **2.3 Activation of Territorial Communities**

Territorial communities are characterized by three integral attributes: they are **consciously lived, objectively determined and self-administrative structures**. In the current situation in the Czech Republic, this definition best fits municipalities, less regions.

The central concept of the behaviour of each territorial community is its own **benefit** – in the form of a diversified comprehensive goal function fulfilling the notions of each particular individual territorial community of the (attainable) **quality of life**. In this perspective the notion of benefit therefore primarily refers to well-being, creation of economic conditions suitable for individual self-realization and creation of conditions suitable for participation in management and administration. At the same time, the benefit does not only have a material dimension

(which more dominates in case of regional communities), on the contrary, it is rather governed (especially in municipalities) by the quality of interpersonal relations, feeling of security and stability, awareness of one's belonging to the community that one knows and by which one is accepted... To activate territorial communities therefore means to provide the human efforts to increase the quality of life and its sustainability not only with a comprehensive content but, first of all, with a **humane dimension and content**.

The first sense of the given strategic move is a *procedural* one: to support the creation of as much as possible free space for the public formulation and fulfilment of the diversified goal function of territorial communities by local actors themselves, as well as the elimination of formal and factual barriers preventing the community from leading a dialogue on the given topic. In other words, the objective of this strategic move is to support the ability (or this ability's potential) of territorial communities to develop their **own, comprehensive and, simultaneously, relatively autonomous strategy of development**.

The *procedural* activation of territorial communities brings both local and general benefit while the former conditions the latter.

On the local level, this implies, first of all, the improvement of interpersonal relations in overcoming mutual alienation. This stimulates the atmosphere of **mutual confidence** that, by itself, induces feelings of security that, by themselves, activate (release) the creative potential of a given community and reduce *transactional costs* on the implementation of aims of common interest. The activation of a territorial community therefore brings benefit to the community itself by suppressing darker sides of its informal structures (unsociability, self-centeredness, preference of partial interests of *local elites* etc.) and formal structures (inflexibility, alienation etc.) while highlighting bright spots of both types of structures.

The process results not only in the enhanced well-being of individual members of a community but – on the practical level – also in a much more efficient use of localized economic sources of development.

As the feeling that **to cooperate pays off** asserts itself in certain locations, it also inevitably (albeit not very fast or automatically) produces improvements in the atmosphere of communication on the national level – by means of the improved political culture, debureaucritized administration, thriving civic initiatives etc.

At this point the given strategic move is closely linked to the quality of life: **to prevent** (while using natural bonds existing within the framework of territorial communities) **the erosion of social cohesion** that endangers the Czech (as well as any other modern) society.

The given strategic move presents the following principal *procedural* goals:

- to maintain local specifics of life styles;
- to improve the functionality of informal local social networks;
- to stimulate the ability of action of local self-governing institutions;


- to ensure equal developmental opportunities for individual communities (in terms of the accessibility of public property and the personal development of individual members of the community)
- to increase the economic responsibility of communities (to motivate rational utilization of local material potential).

In the situation in the Czech Republic, the most direct, however not quite reliable and automatically effective, way to this objective is the active regulation of territorial potentials determining the structure and behaviour of municipalities and regions, by means of targeted policies:

- to improve territorial structures;
- to shape the development of settlements and towns;
- to transform country regions;
- to develop transport and communications;
- to protect environment and take care of natural and cultural heritage.

The improvement (modernization) of local technical conditions of territorial communities must be therefore accompanied by the increase in the **planning autonomy of territorial communities**.

Territorial communities are composed of objective and subjective constituents. The objective constituent (see the diagram below) refers to fixed assets in the form of technical, transport, housing and social infrastructures and fundamental production funds with a relatively long reproduction cycle and hereby also a long fixation (objective factors – at least in the framework of the time of the reproduction cycle). The subjective constituent, on the other hand, refers to social structures, activities, and social and psychological reflections stemming from this definition of localized conditions and retrospectively influencing these conditions – especially by means of the explicitly formulated or implicitly operating processes of management and coordination (by means of strategic planning).



Basically, the given strategic move therefore operates with three types of relations:

1. The relation between localized factual conditions of development and territorial communities (both the existing conditions and their foreseeable autonomous development influence the structure and behaviour of territorial communities).
2. The relation between territorial communities and their external surroundings out of which the community draws spiritual incentives, behavioural patterns and material sources of existence, and which also influence the structure and behaviour of territorial communities.
3. The relation (feedback) between territorial communities and localized conditions of development (how territorial communities retrospectively influence their own local conditions, both in terms of content and process).

In accordance with the structure of this strategic move it is possible to define the following general factors:

Relation no. 1 = territorial potentials

Relation no. 2 = global impulses

Relation no. 3 = formative regulators

Territorial potentials are to be understood as a cross-sectional phenomenon whose influence is not restricted to the issues of a single sector. In agreement with the identification of the relations of the given strategic move, the below listed areas can be considered to be its fundamental pillars:

- Technical infrastructure
- Housing
- Social infrastructure
- National economy
- Environment
- National cultural heritage
- Security

It is significant that in a particular period of time, these fundamental pillars always determine the behaviour of territorial communities:

- as local characteristics (that is, in a particular material structure of a particular place)
- in their mutual interconnection (as a territorial system).

We must admit that territorial potentials in particular represent a factor that can be – within the given strategic move – the one that is most easily analyzed and most easily influenced.

As stated above, the given strategic move is rendered dynamic by the confrontation of Czech territorial communities with technological and social challenges of the modern era.

These challenges undoubtedly deserve an unremitting and close attention if only for the reason that at present we can only calculate with those phenomena that are apparent, or are in such a state of formation that the extent of their future impact on territorial communities can be at least



estimated. This problem primarily concerns the impact of dynamic advancements of scientific progress, engineering and technology. As we can learn from our own experience, however, even the most revolutionary technological breakthroughs always influence the behaviour of territorial communities with a longer or shorter delay – at the point when local actors are able to grasp and effectively apply their results in asserting their own interests.

Being situated somewhere between an informal network and a formal organization, the territorial community perceives the universally influential regulators of social and economic behaviours, e.g. market, state and civil society, as an **external force** that poses *external tasks* to which the community's structure has to adjust. It follows from the nature of these universal formative regulators that it is namely the formal structures that have to adjust themselves: companies have to make use of localized conditions in order to maximize the immediate economic effect, local administration has to meet requirements imposed by the state, civic initiatives have to “*subject local action to global thinking.*” This adjustment of formal structures to universally operating regulators can result in the disintegration of a local community, or even in its extinction.

The cohesion of the community is therefore determined by the extent to which it succeeds in activating informal structures and incentives. Not in opposition to the universally operating regulators but for the sake of the reconciliation of their outcomes! **Informal structures then represent a distinctive local formative regulator.** They include such phenomena as, for instance, spontaneous solidarity of community members (which may be transformed into a symbolic level – local patriotism), the capability of mutual communication and dialogue, the ability to build informal and formal networks in order to identify and enforce their common interests.

All of these *informal regulators* of the behaviour of local communities come together to willingness, skill and determination of a territorial community to hold a dialogue and to work out strategic plans for its common future.

Hence on the local level the tactic and strategic cooperation plays the role of a decisive formative regulator. It works like a *litmus paper* measuring the level of activation of territorial communities. It is both a key prerequisite and the outcome of the implementation of the given strategic move.

## **2.4 Ways of Development of Social Cohesion and National and Civic Identity**

The way to social cohesion through plurality represents the biggest challenge our society is going to face in the oncoming decades.

Newly born challenges also present new chances. Chances of development, but also chances of extinction. It is precisely the extent to which we will manage to ground social cohesion in such foundations that would meet pluralist challenges (that is, in particular, creativity and co-responsibility inspired by an infinite number of diverse and mutually respectful and stimulating

incentives), determining whether the exploitation of new chances will result in the increase in the life quality, in the economic growth and the development of conditions necessary for sustainable life, i.e. whether the new chances will contribute to the growth or the extinction.

If social cohesion and identities are not directed towards the growth of quality and sustainability of life, this trend ousts the society, communities, institutions, groups and individuals outside the challenges of the contemporary type of culture, resulting in underdevelopment, conflicts and social exclusion. Our effort to determine the main trends of development of social cohesion and national and civic identity in our country, to interpret these trends in the context of new challenges of plurality and to search for possibilities of the rapprochement of the two – i.e. the trends of development and the challenges of plurality – constitute the content of this strategic move.

New challenges for social cohesion and for the concept of national and civic identity are entering a situation in which our society tends to follow ways related to trends that, in the long run, are not very favourable to new challenges. The concept of the given strategic move calls for the transformation of the general notion of the development of social cohesion, and national and civic identity. The reason is that the existing trends do not seem to offer any sources that would work as a propelling force, accelerating and improving the future development of our society.

The objective of this strategic move is therefore to find possibilities of a balanced combination between:

- the suppression of the negative impact of the existing trends in the development of social cohesion and identity so that they would not turn into barriers preventing development;
- and the strengthening of the emerging positive trends in the development of social cohesion and national and civic identity;

evaluated according to the degree to which they strengthen life quality, economic growth and the development of conditions necessary for sustainable life – to put it briefly – according to the extent to which they represent the increase in importance, impact and acceptability of trends empowering pluralist perspectives of the world.

This definition of the strategic move is grounded in the understanding of trends and conditions of social solidarity and national and civic identity in the Czech society. These trends include:

- 1. Trends issuing from universal effects of modernization and globalization.** They lay down new and, in contrast to the existing trends, significantly different foundations of social existence: the interaction in global networks is impersonal, changeable, unstable, and unlimited. The value of these trends lies in presenting one's participation in the global virtual existence. They represent a diversion from the still influential roots of identity and result in a unity grounded in completely different foundations than ever before. Multicultural relations, symptomatic of the modernizing part of the globalized world, gain value not only for representing ethnic differences or unity, but as immediate starting points of developmental processes. The new wave of modernization and

globalization trends inevitably produces the ever growing gaping of social structures, deteriorating communication and even a new type of questions of identity and social cohesion that a majority of people would hardly consider, let alone be able to answer them. At the same time, however, the destruction of present sources of social interactions (which have not been replaced by new intelligible sources yet) cuts down identity and social cohesion and consequently results in feelings of danger, which the afflicted majority of people have to resist. These factors embody potential conflicts that have perhaps never been so powerful.

2. **Developmental trends in the national existence.** The sources of national identity in the Czech society seem to be deeply embedded, but not very intense. National feelings and identification of oneself as a member of the Czech nation are not very strong and can therefore by themselves hardly serve as a more radical empowering element of social cohesion.

It is difficult to recognize what position is taken up by myths amidst the other aspects of forming collective and national feelings. However, it is indisputable that such myths do exist. In the first place, they include the fear of the new, the rejection of the unknown, the endeavour to enclose oneself in one's own limited space resistible – as much as possible – to hostile extraneous influences. There is also quite a prominent occurrence of egalitarian tendencies and demands of uniformity and undifferentiability, and the idea that such unification can better withstand external dangers. The idea of the maltreated, peace-loving, and small, who are constantly endangered so that they have to seek protection of their own country, is also quite widespread as well as the idea of the necessity to make use of any possible means in order to secure the survival of the Czech nation: starting with the unlimited creativity (including creativity that breaks the law) to an almost unlimited conformity demanding power; from the effort to survive at any cost to macho extreme reactions lacking a deeper context; from outslipping, parasitism and the Good-Soldier-Schweik manners to making sacrifice in the name of ideas whose time has not come yet.

Even though the aspects of national identity are not, as mentioned above, very intense, they are comprehensible for the majority of the Czech nation. And their importance is even growing when they join the tendencies to refuse the extraneous. The national identity thus may – especially if in the other spheres the population loses its footing in identification processes – emerge in a convincing messianic role. If social cohesion and civic identity, as well as identities traditionally associated with the family, region, religion, place, profession and social position, are all in decline, the strengthening of the national identity may assume a pivotal position. Perhaps also because it will *remain* the only one of comprehensible collective identities, collective foundations of social cohesion.

**3. Context of the accession to EU.** The list below specifies the most important influences that are both new and rather threatening:

- Gradually dissolving borders that used to define national and state identity;
- Considerable, perhaps even sweeping challenges and influences of new, and in our country so-far unheard-of, cultures and ethnics, each time bringing very profound social impacts, quite unprecedented in our long mono-ethnic history;
- Open confrontations of the exiting sources of national self-confidence with offers, experiences and practices presented by stronger and more successful nations, ethnics and states equipped with different social and historical experience within EU. This entails a different perspective in evaluating possibilities and futures of the (national) identity: those who are less successful, less disposed to succeed, to assert themselves and hence to respect themselves, and those who are really weaker, will be suddenly disclosed;
- A different position of civic initiatives and activities in social life, including respect of decision-making bodies for civic initiatives as a crucial feedback, in contrast to the existing development and accelerated concentration on long-term and value-productive processes and activities in each decision-making process;
- Shifts from the orientation to fast results towards the orientation to rules and ways of problem solving. It entails visibility, discriminability and argumentation for development of democratic procedures, emphasis on the observation of rules and on the way of reaching these goals as a crucial constituent of the goals themselves;
- Preference to dialogue and consensus over conflict, fight and barricade-building, especially in public life;
- Respect for value impact and models embodied in the performance of politicians and opinion-makers. Politicians are also responsible for the type of values they offer through their actions – in comparison with their programmatic proclamations and requirements from the others. This calls for sharper criticism of politicians and media models and for preparations for self-criticism and value self-reflection within political structures. Again, this approach is not very characteristic of Czech politicians and opinion-makers;
- Establishing and developing institutional foundations serving the transformation and stabilization of the aforementioned procedures. These are namely institutions providing independent supervision and feedback, stimuli to the development of civic initiatives and to the participation of largest possible parts of population in public life, but also in life of schools, educational and training institutions, churches and cultural institutions in the narrow sense of the word. This means establishing and developing institutions while respecting requirements of subsidiarity and bringing maximum opportunities for the stimulation of creativity and initiatives of the public. At the same time, it means creating an institutional base for presentations, discussions and appeals for ethical evaluating approaches to the Czech (especially public and political) existence and its reflections in media, and appeals for inspiration and respected co-partners in taking decisions on the life of society;

- Facing challenges presented by a different form of civic identity in a majority of EU countries;
- Seeing the world through the eyes of a minority because (as follows from the aforementioned characteristics) we will assume, either willingly or unwillingly, a minority position within EU. In fact, we will jump from a majority, enclosed and self-centred society into a minority position endangered by the sea of stronger EU citizens with different social, economic, linguistic, cultural and empirical roots, who, in addition to that, may not be well disposed to accept and respect the “*new, small, poor, who have to be subsidized, strange, post-communist*” EU members.
- Newly arising questions of ethnic conflicts and tensions within EU states and community, including positions that are different from the ours, on the way to pluralist attitudes and experience in these countries;
- Comparison of long-term experience and collaborative methods between the majority and minorities in many EU countries, on one hand, and the approaches and acceptance of minorities by Czech population – at this point the difference in the plurality level is even more striking;
- Newly emerging opportunities of employment abroad (in fact only for certain, not very large, segments of population) and simultaneously increasing opportunities of, and activities in, the growth of proportions and need to employ foreign citizens in the Czech Republic, in the light of constant, comparatively high, rates of unemployment and widening social gaps;

Despite the apparent discord in the effects of the aforementioned trends, the Czech population **does not ask itself any questions about changes in national and civic identity at all.** That is why the objective of this strategic move can be *only to put up signposts and search for ways* whose directions are still within the compass of the existing development, e.g. the skills of freedom, unrestricted growth of creativity and learning, and the application of responsibilities of people, groups, communities and institutions.

Proposals for particular measures can be only thought of as examples conceived within the framework of these areas. It is mostly impossible to determine agents of these tasks, their expenses, duration and other attributes of management and forecasts.

Despite all the limitations, however, it holds true that if the existing trends of the development of social solidarity and identity are to persist, in the oncoming 10-15 years they might become a source of conflicts with a deadly grave impact on the development of Czech society, lasting for decades, if not even for a longer period of time.

The implementing procedure of the given strategic move *advances* in the following main streams:

1. **Infiltration into the public awareness:** an altered approach to the solving of social problems. That requires:

2. **New content of the Czech national identity and the related social cohesion.** New challenges, circumstances, and political and cultural contexts directed to a new concept of national identity, and accordingly conceived social cohesion, are in stark contrast to internal developmental trends in the national identity of the Czech society. The gap is so wide that in order bridge it, we will have to ask ourselves such questions about our national identity that have never been asked before. They largely concern the problem of new demands to be met in search for a new content of the Czech national identity.
3. **Direct orientation to the development of the social context of life.** Firstly, this means developing activities focused on the growth of abilities and skills applied in social relations (activities directly aimed at the training of social skills and the development of communication, dialogue and empathic skills; strengthening social relations and potential for their development in institutions whose main mission is not education or upbringing; a strong emphasis on the development of the school system as one of socializing mediators that are only effective in cooperation with the other mediators, primarily the family). Secondly, this means developing activities that enhance the awareness of cohesion (mutual cooperation between senders and addressees of social aid; the largest possible variety and differentiation of social subsidies strengthening solidarity; aid to families; care of improvements in social security; activities related to the improvements in conditions and opportunities of the equal access to education for largest possible proportions of population). And, thirdly, it means developing activities that support participation in the execution and examination of power (developing the political system).
4. **Development of national and civic self-confidence in the sphere of culture, arts, sports and other activities.**
5. **Development of the civic sector as a base for acquiring responsibility** (development of volunteerism, cooperation of non-governmental non-profit organizations and their associating).
6. **Development of media as an instrument of raising responsibility, freedom, and national and civic identity** (differentiated and differentiating multicultural, pluralist character of media; the openness of media to their own evaluation; clear orientation to the interactive media).

## **2.5 Modernization of Democracy in the Czech Republic – General Prerequisite for the Implementation of the Strategic Moves**

The implementation of all the strategic moves presupposes, to various degrees, a social dialogue, and requires, again to various degrees, the exercise of the leading and coordinating role of public power and administration. In this sense the strategic moves are determined by a level of democracy and by directions, forms and a speed of its modernization.

Confronted with literature on political science, the Czech democracy is still apparently *incomplete*. It suffers from a considerably blocked feedback to the sources of power (people), and between political centres and decentralized administration, and also shows but a small degree of openness of politics towards society. Only with difficulties does the political scene react to the modernization of society and so far has not established any institutions characterized by *sensitive responsibility vis-à-vis* minorities and those citizens who are insufficiently informed and who are socially, economically and culturally disadvantaged. Neither has the political power developed a dialogue with the middle and lower links of the society.

Political power and its accessibility have deviated towards the preference of political parties, their privileged position, including governing processes (selection of candidates for elections, decision-making, political power control, selection and supervision of the implementation of political agendas, limited participation of civil society etc.). Political parties have so far resisted the modernization and tend to succumb to, rather than positively resolve, the pressures of market subjects on decisions adopted by the Parliament and the Government. They have not yet become full-fledged subjects of political consciousness and knowledgeability informing the public about fundamental questions of social development. First and foremost, however, their representatives lag behind in their preparedness to perform state power as a public service, as well as in their professional qualifications in politics and culture. The constitutional description of political parties and political associations does not provide sufficient definitions of their positions and restrictions in the structure of power. This undoubtedly contributes to a tendency in which political parties struggle for power privileges and prevent other organizations and their representatives from participating in decision-making. This has gradually produced certain groups of “citizens of the first rank” (who can afford it and can have even more) and groups of “citizens of the second and other ranks” whose typical experience can be defined as social and economic powerlessness. Consequently, this has resulted in general deep mistrust in political parties and in low, almost critical participation in parliamentary elections over the recent years, and has gravely upset the fundamental condition of the generation of political power through elections – the equality of electors.

Relations between the three pillars of democratic power – legislative, executive and judicatory power – still remain rather underdeveloped and permeated with occasional ambiguities in terms of authority, which makes mutual supervision more difficult. The situation is further aggravated by the chronic postponing of the reform of the judiciary system.

To date there is no system of institutions providing precise definitions of the relations of authority between the public and private sectors and effectively preventing corruption in public administration.

This deplorable situation is further deepened by a vague relationship of elected representatives in state executive and in state and other public administrative bodies, who toss about in conflict

between their carriers and their pretended loyalty to political parties in hope of getting lifelong privileges for their merits.

This produces a hardly controllable bureaucratic system of administration, frequently removed from effective implementation of political decisions and laws. The participation of retired politicians in this field only complicates and professionally degrades the performance of the entire state administration as it opens it up to clientelism and pressure groups usurping the right to adjust the interpretation and implementation of laws, especially subordinate norms, to serve their own benefit.

The common denominators (frequently both causes and consequences) of these defects in democracy in the Czech Republic in the post-November period are:

1. **Backward level of democratic conviction of citizens**, contaminated by remnants of social consciousness dating to the previous communist regime that used to be, and still are being, reactivated even by some political parties and practices of a part of state administration. This frequently results in deliberately obscure interpretations of what democracy is, or is not, about and which rules and principles are, or are not, democratic. This phenomenon afflicts both the quality of citizenship, its electoral and decision-making potential and its role of the power examiner, and political elites themselves (primarily lawmakers and executors of state power). If we are to consider the level of democratic conviction of citizens and political elites as a key and starting point of the modernization of the political system, then we should not resolve this issue separately but as a component of the orientation to the knowledge society and by learned habits of political culture. It will therefore affect the entire educational system (e.g. elementary schools, cultural symbols, social rituals, preparation of political, economic and cultural elites etc.).
2. **Premature institutions of the democratic political system** that find themselves in a phase of adopting temporary practical measures rather than building their long-term position, broadly anchored in negotiations of political elites and citizens. The modernization of democracy must therefore also focus on this weak point of the political transformation. In doing so, institutions should be mutually interconnected in order to guarantee democratic development.
3. **Restricted implementation of the principle of democratic representation**, mostly serving to establish principal state and municipal authorities, represents yet another incomplete transformation of the democratic political system that still prevents full-fledged interaction between the sources of political power and citizens. Lower links gradually become performing their competencies, however, without being adequately supported by elements of the central public administration. As a consequence, the authority of regional administration is restricted and the installation of authorized municipalities is rather complicated.



4. **Approach of democratic representatives on all levels towards proposals for agendas and programmatic issues of political decision-making** is still rather on the level of *commenting* and not on the level of negotiations conducted by equal partners. These issues arouse the need to complete the representative system and, first of all, open it up to non-party subjects, especially civic subjects. This entails a renaissance of certain institutions, such as the referendum on important questions of social orientation, access of independent candidates to representative mandates on all administrative levels, openness of the centre to monitoring and reflection of public opinion and the voices of representatives of voluntary interest associations, scientists and other experts etc. The issue is also closely linked to the concept of democracy in the post-communist society that is not understood as operations of a society in its entirety, i.e. including its unpolitical elements, but is largely limited to the system derived from political parties. And it is precisely modernized political parties that might become subjects transferring the focus of democratic operations to the entire society and doing away with the isolation of party politics from citizens.
5. **Adequate reflection of the plurality of the Czech society** ranks among the essential components of the modernization process of a democratic political system. Some minorities do not hold equal positions in this system and that is why they cannot participate in the production and examination of political power according to their needs and interests. The political system in its current condition usually reacts only when a conflict situation arises, however, it hardly assists minorities to be able to establish themselves as autonomous and respected social subjects, able to express their political and existential interests. In this area the political power does not dispose of long-term programs solving the given problems, e.g. the situation of the Roma community, ethnic minorities and other groups of immigrants, especially from eastern countries of the former Soviet Union. To a considerable extent, this issue is also linked to the political position of the handicapped, the disabled, the unemployed, gays and lesbians etc. In some cases, the specific concentration of minority problems may be exposed in certain regions, which reveals the necessity to search for possible solutions not only on the central level of decision-making but on the regional and municipal levels as well. Attention paid to these problems is crucial in the areas of social cohesion and identity, as well as in establishing equal conditions in elections and participation in decision-making.
6. **Market influence on the political system** represents a problem that has not been overcome by our democracy to date. However, it is also a general problem that gains size along with growing aggressiveness of transnational monopolies. Unfortunately, there are still no clues how to solve this issue: besides ethic appeals there is nothing that could prevent the political system from intervening economic interests of the market sector. The issue gets even more entangled as the public sector, which is fully at disposal of political power, needs the assistance of private companies in order to be

effective. This opens up ways to the corruption of public officials and to their susceptibility to accommodate interests of economic subjects (which are ostensibly presented as public or national interests). This results in the abuse of the democratic system, clientelism and loss of public trust. It is unquestionable that there will be no progress made in this respect if we keep relying on the nobility of holders and executors of political power and on democratic responsibility of entrepreneurs and if we do not subject this sphere of relations to civic examination.

7. Politico-administrative relations represent a critical problem protracting from history to date. In other words – it is the relationship of elected representatives (legislators and executives, e.g. ministers) and the state, or self-governing administration. There is a certain incongruity: if the administration is not qualified enough, the elected representatives become dependent on administrative routinists who take advantage of their favourable position and who take over power operations by such methods that frequently get out of control of the public. At the same time, however, all the steps that have been undertaken to counter this practice so far *have not succeeded*, e.g. the postponed effect of the adopted law on civil service, according to which the supervision of administrative bureaucracy would be not only possible but even directly incorporated into the internal routines of ministries and other state and public organizations.
8. This issue is connected to another defect of our political system – **the lack of consensus among political parties in important matters, such as the exercise of state power**. The roots of this problem can be found in the vicious circle of the overly aggravated struggle of political parties for their share of power. The modernization of democracy feels the need to define its causes as a consequence of insufficient modernization of political parties, which lags behind transformations of civilizational development and, figuratively speaking, *debauches*, or at least does not uplift, *democratic feelings of citizens* who would not otherwise tolerate such behaviour of political parties. At this point we can find a way to bring political parties closer to their *statesmanlike* role and responsibilities.

Our findings about the historical development of democracy and its expected future, as presented in outstanding works on political science, and *practical* criticism of re-established democracy in the Czech Republic after 1989, point out at several significant warnings that are important for the orientation of the modernization of the democratic political system of the Czech Republic.

While the institutions determining power structures (such as, for instance, political parties, the Parliament, the Government, President) have acquired a more or less stable position, the system proves to be gravely deficient in that it is separated from, and hardly communicates with people, the citizens, who decide about this system in elections. This primarily concerns the underdeveloped opportunities to participate in supervision and decision-making of political

representatives. Decentralization and the expansion of democratic self-administration onto regional and municipal levels is only in its beginnings, however, so far it has disposed of neither enough will, nor elaborate qualifications to carry out any significant changes.

Based on the given conditions, it is necessary to direct the modernization of the democratic political system to a set of conditions and activities related to the opening up of an independent public space, opportunities for public discussion in it and the structuring of the civil society, especially non-profit organizations and self-administrations, and their communication with political power and its institutions. It is crucial to **enhance civic competencies** in influencing the quality of democracy and, at the same time, to transform the political scene into such a one that would support this trend.

The modernization of democracy therefore includes:

- Corresponding modernization of political institutions, including political parties and legislative, executive and judicatory power;
- Modernization processes of unpolitical or transpolitical subjects, such as knowledge driven society, information society, activation of territorial communities, voluntary civil organizations, factors effecting cohesion and identity of the society and its security system;

To summarize: the modernization of democracy becomes integrated into one trend by *“opening and constituting a democratic public space and by forming the independent public”*.

This determines the objectives and subjects of the modernization solution:

- The principal aim is to enhance competencies and activities of citizens in implementing the democratic principle of *people’s government, or governing through people and for people*.
- A concurrent aim is to *open up the public space* and to create conditions for its use for social activation of people and for their influence on political power.

The main actors of this solution are expected to be:

- civil society, citizens and their organizations;
- institutions of the political system, especially political parties and political associations;
- the Parliament, the Government and judicatory power;
- self-administration on all levels and of all types;
- modernization institutions of the society (educational, information, self-administrative, economic, cultural, security and communication institutions, including media).

The timing of the modernization process in the Czech Republic is to be conditioned by the implementation of the individual strategic moves presenting not only a consequence but also a **key prerequisite of the modernization of democracy**.

There are three types of determination:

1. to launch several urgent processes (e.g. creating conditions favourable to opening up the public space and examining its actual use by citizens);
2. long-term determination (e.g. initiating an educational process aimed at improving education and democratic conviction of young generations of citizens);
3. continuous determination (e.g. gradual transformation of political institutions requiring several preparatory phases).

## **2.6 Relations among the Strategic Moves**

**On closer examination of the individual strategic moves it becomes evident that:**

- the individual strategic moves can complement and support one another, as well as share individual processes;
- the implementation of one strategic move can represent a precondition for the implementation of another one while this preconditioning may have a latent character;
- they may compete with one another for resources necessary for their implementation;
- they may have to struggle with contradictory effects produced by one another; not always may the implementation of one strategic move have positive, or at least neutral, effects on the implementation of the other one.

**Yet the fundamental compatibility of the strategic moves remains to be a significant prerequisite. The model situation of their simultaneous implementation even presupposes that the strategic moves may have a positive synergic effect on the overall condition of the society, indicated by the quality and sustainability of life and by the economic growth.**

Two strategic moves (hereinafter only SM) show a very close relationship between the quality and sustainability of life and the economic growth. These are namely *SM Ways of Development of Social Cohesion and National and Civic Identity* and *SM Cultivation of Knowledge into a Key Factor of Production*.

*The SM Activation of Territorial Communities* links up *the goal and conditional* modes: It represents a contemporary formation of regulatory conditions and effects reflected in the way, quality and sustainability of life and economic growth, in a specific projection of life of territorial units (municipalities, regions). In this sense it is also simultaneously more synthetic and more specific, representing a sort of live research laboratory in which we can test to what extent the strategic moves have a chance to enter social practices as *comprehensively conceived procedural innovations* effecting conditions and, at the same time, heading towards goals.

The last *SM System of Comprehensive Security Management* is justified primarily because of transforming and multiplying security risks. It is intended to curb security risks to the state at the time of global threats. It thus represents a general precondition of the implementation of all the other strategic moves but, first of all, of the very existence of the society.

The outline of the summarizing *Modernization of Democracy* indicates that our concept aims at a cultivation of very broadly conceived processes of governance and self- management pertaining to both people and institutions, freedom and responsibility, order and space designed for creation. In this sense it can be interpreted as the formation of a dynamic network containing a sometimes-undistinguishable combination of factual tasks and regulatory processes. In this interpretation the cultivation of the national infrastructure of governance will represent a general precondition (and in all its factual aspects also a component) of all the strategic moves.

**The strategic moves may enter the herein contemplated futures of the country as coordinated streams of innovations reacting to the familiar (predictable) disproportions that threaten the quality and sustainability of life, or the economic growth. However, we cannot determine in advance what may block their ways, what kind of barriers they may run into. It is therefore impossible to try to do away with a dynamic imbalance that accompanies the development of every society, nevertheless, it is possible to search for a way of predicting these disproportions beforehand and to minimize them by an effective combination of available resources.** Fundamentally, this will be an open dynamic process offering enough space both for the completion, elaboration or revision of the already proposed strategic moves and for proposals for new ones. **If the public policy and administration keeps developing its strategic dimension further on, the strategic moves, regarded by the state political representation as cardinal procedural innovations modifying life conditions and ways of life, will be elaborated on in more definite, but also more imperative, programmatic and conceptual documents.**

### 3 SCENARIOS

Three scenarios of possible developments of the Czech Republic until 2020:

**Prognostic scenarios are fabricated stories about possible futures. Their stories are similar to those in fairy tales: they always start off introducing motivation of single actors and barriers they have to overcome on their way. Like in fairy tales, the scenario actors, endowed with bigger or smaller portions of resoluteness, also struggle with these barriers in order to succeed in the end. However, the scenarios differ from fairy tales in that respect that their plots cannot be based on unrestrained fabulation, and the less so on the conjecture of the existence of supernatural forces. On the contrary: they must treat social facts very carefully and compose them into a plausible interpretative framework.**

The main purpose of these scenarios is to provoke thinking and show that the future is unknown and open, and that many things depend on us, on our decisions, qualifications and the nature of goals we set for ourselves, on our ability to team up and strive towards our goals in coordinated collective actions. None of the scenarios presented below tells *the only right* story offering a sort of an idealized idea of a desirable development of the country. Neither is any of the scenarios a deterrent, admonitory story aimed at mobilizing readers to stop the described development at any cost. All of them attempt at illustrating possible, perhaps somewhat exaggerated to extremes but still conceivable, alternative ways of our travelling into our own future. The scenarios cannot bring an entirely positive or entirely negative impact. Similar to the real life, everything has to be paid for here and so success in one field is usually redeemed by retardation or a failure in other fields.

The scenarios are based on findings and conceptual starting points that have been acquired by the CESES team over the past two years. All the scenarios are recounted in the past tense, that means as fictitious stories, as if they have already happened. All of them proceed from the following assumptions:

1. The Czech Republic will accede the European Union in 2004 and from then on it will not be possible for its internal development to be in stark contrast to main developmental trends in this bloc – even though we cannot rule out various tensions and conflicts caused by persistent differences in historical roots, institutional frameworks and life standards.
2. The basic time horizon of the scenarios is the year of 2020; nevertheless, consequences of certain decisions and developmental trends (for instance in the areas of ecology and population growth) will be elaborated for longer periods of time.
3. The given period of time will not be a witness to any radical twists or civilizational turns that would fundamentally alter the life conditions in the Czech Republic (such as, for instance, consequences of the use of the weapons of mass destruction, a pandemic outbreak of a fatal disease, the application of scientific findings radically transforming

- human abilities or the length of human life, the world dominated by a totalitarian power etc.).
4. The scenarios aim at exposing possible developments in the fundamental spheres of social life (politics, economy, public administration, public, business and civic sectors, population, work, family, social differentiation, life style, and values). The final selection of these areas and topics is subject to the interpretative logic of individual scenarios.
  5. The scenarios present various social actors driven by their differentiated, frequently conflicting, motivations and interests.

The basic differentiating criterion of the scenarios is their emphasis on one of the three key criteria of possible future developments of the Czech Republic: the quality of life (here and now), sustainability of life or economic growth.

The main requirement for all the scenarios is their credibility: although all of them *attempt* at the biggest possible application of their key criterion as an orientation aid in the tuning of the entire story, they have to, at the same time, respect the known proportions of sources, conditions, factual contexts and certain inertia in the behaviour of people and institutions in time, and therefore cannot utterly ignore the remaining two criteria.

These are namely the following three scenarios:

**To Survive at Peace and Calm or to Get Going? (scenario based on the criterion of the quality of life)**

On its accession to EU, the Czech society, so many times having been exposed to external forces and unable to influence them by itself, retained a considerable defensive reflex it had developed in the past – the orientation to maintaining relatively decent life standards, aversion to take risks, to change deep-rooted habits, to give an extraordinary performance or to pay earnest attention to long-lasting effects of its conduct (for example, in terms of the environmental impact). It demonstrated an inclination that could be described as *guzzling away its own future*. This approach, becoming dominant, among other things, also thanks to weak governments, ran up against its own limits after some time. In the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, following some significant structural transformations, institutions and people eventually adapted themselves to greater demands of the globalized world. However, this was made possible only due to a considerable split within the society into an elite, resolutely oriented to performance and embracing new challenges, and most of the population, whose way of life was still largely characterized by its endeavour to survive comfortably, *here and now*.

**The Czech Republic as a Central-European Tiger (scenario based on the criterion of economic growth)**

On its accession to EU, the Czech Republic began pursuing its new central goal – fast economic growth. It was being accomplished by intense support of entrepreneurship, application of information and communication technologies, cutting down public budget

deficits, quick introduction of EURO, and a certain increase in the offer of educational opportunities by means of investment in human capital. The social security scheme was being neglected and the support of other public institutions (school system, health system etc.) was also decreasing. Social cohesion was disrupted and, to a certain extent, political stability as well. After ten years of its membership in EU, the Czech Republic had to solve protracted problems of stagnating regions and had to strive to achieve harmonious growth.

**Bohemia and Moravia – The Garden of Europe (scenario based on the criterion of the sustainability of life)**

On its accession to EU, the Czech Republic was paying heed to the perspective of sustainable development – perhaps even more than its neighbouring countries. People and institutions were trying to eliminate environmental threats as they considered them a fundamental appeal to change their own behaviour. Their efforts were assisted by a gradually promoted ecological tax reform, the orientation of agriculture to renewable sources of energy and structural changes in transport and housing. The main emphasis was primarily laid on the preservation of nature as a precondition of accomplishing all the other goals, even at the expense of slower economic growth and lower investment in human development.



## Conclusion

In search for the priorities for the Czech Republic we are, and we shall always be, *on the way*. The ways and the landscape itself may change and will change. What is important, however, is the *openness* of our search for the best itinerary – anybody who is interested can participate. Another characteristic feature is our *effort to respect meaningful implications*. Here we provide our readers of this study, which represents a logical sequel to our previous works (Vize, 2001; Pruvodce, 2002), both with outcomes of our representative enquiry into opinions of Czech inhabitants – *The Czechs on the Way to their Own Future*, and with a summarizing elaboration on our findings about possible futures and conditions of the world development – *What We Know about the Future*. Our team research work has been completed with the *identification of the key strategic moves*, proposals for concentrated streams of desirable social changes that, in our opinion, could become a propelling force ensuring the high quality and sustainable development of life in the Czech Republic, and thus also contribute to the monitoring of this criterion in life of the entire humankind. In addition, we offer *three scenarios of the development of the Czech Republic until 2020*, each of them based on the prerequisite of credible pursuance of one of the three key criteria of prospective future developments of the Czech Republic – either the quality of life, sustainability of life or economic growth.

We suppose that we shall be able to further elaborate on our knowledge in cooperation with you, the readers of the present study – whether it will be by enriching and elaborating on theoretical methods, the analytical knowledge base and methodical procedures, or by conceiving alternative contingent visions of possible futures of the Czech Republic. We presume that the logic of our work will primarily lead us to a further elaboration on the identified *strategic moves* and to prospective proposals for new moves. We also believe that this study will prove inspiring in working out medium-term concepts and developmental plans on all levels of public administration and commercial and civic sectors.

Our contact and continuing productive cooperation with you, our readers, have always meant, and will always mean, a great support and encouragement in our work.

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